University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
FOUNDED

1852

Formerly

American Law Register
VOL. 119

NOVEMBER

1970

No. 1

ADIvINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND THE
CONTROL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
JAMES
I.

INTRODUCTION

II. WHO Is

III.

0.

FREEDMAN i

..................................

TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT? ..............................

4

A. Applicability of the APA Generally ............
B. Legislative History of Section 2 ..............
C. Judicial Decisions ..........................
D. Administration of OFDI ....................
E. Analysis and Conclusion .....................

4
6
12
13
16

APPLICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
TO COMPLIANCE PROCEEDINGS .........................

A.
B.
C.
D.
IV.

2

THE AGENCY FOR PURPOSES OF THE ADMINIS-

"'Required by Statute"........................
ConstitutionalRequirement of a Hearing .......
Foreign Affairs Functions ...................
Conclusion ................................

THE ROLE

OF

THE HEARING EXAMINER

PLIANCE PROCEEDINGS

IN

18
19
21
24
27

COM-

...........................

A. Designationof a PresidingOfficer .............
B. Waiver of a Hearing Exaininer ..............
C. Conclusion ................................

28
28
29
35

f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1957, Harvard University;
LL.B. 1962, Yale University. Member, New Hampshire Bar. This article is based
upon research I conducted as a consultant to the Office of Foreign Direct Investments, U.S. Department of Commerce. The Office of Foreign Direct Investments
has not evaluated or approved this article; the responsibility for its contents is solely
mine. The questions considered in Parts II and IV are presently under review by
the Office. I am greatly indebted to Henry S. Bryans of the class of 1971 for his
devoted and imaginative assistance.

2

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
V.

[Vo1.119:1

SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS AND DISQUALIFICATION FOR
B IAS

..........................................

A. Separation of Functions .....................
1. "Investigative or Prosecuting Functions" .
2. Investigators and Prosecutors as Supervisors and Subordinates ...............
B. Disqualificationfor Bias .....................
VI. PROCEDURES

FOR

DETERMINING

SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATIONS

APPLICATIONS

67
67
68
80

THE REQUIREMENT THAT GROUNDS FOR DECISION BE
STATED IN DETERMINING APPLICATIONS ..............

A. Proposalsfor Informal Voluntary Settlements ...
B. Applications for Specific Authorizations ........
C. Conclusion ................................
VIII.

44
56

FOR

.......................

A. "Case of Adjudication"......................
B. "Required by Statute" or Constitution .........
C. Conclusion ................................
VII.

35
36
40

POSTSCRIPT:

THE ADAPTABILITY

OF

THE

80
81
84
90

ADMINIS-

TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT .........................

90

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1968, President Johnson created by executive order
a federal program of mandatory limits on the amount of foreign investment that United States citizens and businesses would be permitted
to make each year.' The order, relying upon the power given the
President by section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,2
delegated to the Secretary of Commerce the authority to administer
the program toward the objective of "strengthening the balance of
payments position of the United States during this national emergency" 3-- that is, the national emergency declared by President Truman
in 1950 and still in effect.' On the same day the Secretary of Commerce announced that he had created the Office of Foreign Direct
Investments (OFDI) and had subdelegated to it the authority to
administer the Foreign Direct Investment Program."
1 Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. 433 (1970), 12 U.S.C. § 95a (Supp. V, 1970).
Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, originally enacted as the
Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 966, has been amended several times
and is now codified at both 12 U.S.C. § 95a5 (1964) and 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1964).
Hereafter it will be cited as 12 U.S.C. § 9 a (1964).
3 Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. 433 (1970), 12 U.S.C. § 95a (Supp. V, 1970).
4 Proclamation No. 2914, Dec. 16, 1950, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C.
App. § 1 (1964); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
5Dep't of Commerce Order 184-A, 33 Fed. Reg. 54 (1968).
2
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The limitations upon foreign direct investment are embodied in
the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations,' a complex set of substantive rules that OFDI administers and that it has amended on a
number of occasions as experience has recommended and as the nation's
balance of payments position has changed.' Questions of the legality
and wisdom of the program and the regulations have been raised-by
political candidates, by Congressional committees,9 and by commentators 'q-but OFDI has yet to be involved in litigation during its first
three years of existence."
The basic scheme of the regulations restricts net transfers of
capital '2 between "direct investors" 13 and their "affiliated foreign
nationals" "4and limits the amount of earnings that a direct investor
may authorize an affiliated foreign national to reinvest. 5 The limita6 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.101-1000.1303 (1970).

7See, e.g., 34 Fed. Reg. 9564 (1969); Ellicott, United States Controls on Foreign
Direct Investment: The 1969 Program, 34 LAW & CoNTEmIp. PRos. 47, 48 (1969) ;
Lancaster, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A Look at Ad Hoc Rule-

making, 55 VA. L. REv. 83, 132-33 (1969).
SSee Statement of Richard M. Nixon, describing the Foreign Direct Investment
Program as "'economic isolationism at its worst'" and characterizing it as "'without
Congressional approval'" and "'based on questionable legal authority.'" Wall St. J.,
Oct. 3, 1968, at 1, col. 3; id., at 4, cols. 3-4.
9 See Hearings on House Concurrent Resolutions 85 and 86 Before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969); H.R. Con. Res. 815, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), introduced and
discussed, 114 CONG. REc. 27199 (1968).
10 See Adler, The Framework for Research Into Direct Manufacturing Investment
Overseas, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1969); Behrman, Assessing the Foreign
Investment Controls, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 84 (1969); Furth, Barriers to
Investment Abroad as Tools of Payments Policy, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64
(1969) ; Laffer, The U.S. Balance of Paynents-A Financial Center View, 34 LAW
& 0NTEMP. PROB. 33 (1970); Note, The Foreign Direct Investment Controls, 11
HAmv.INT'L L.J. 490 (1970); Note, The Foreign Direct Investment Program: An
Analysis and Critique, 55 VA. L. REv. 139 (1969).
Other discussions include Asher, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations,
27 N.Y.U. INsT. oN FED. TAX. 955 (1969); Baker, Tax and Related Issues Under
the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations, 21 TAX LAW. 531 (1968); DeVries,
The New Controls on Foreign Investment, 49 Cni. B. REc. 349 (1968); Frolich &
Ettinger, Current Planning Considerations Under Foreign Direct Investment Controls,
30 J. TAX. 30 (1969) ; Goldman, New Controls on Foreign Investment: What Tax
Men Need to Know About E.O. 11387, 28 J. TAX. 168 (1968) ; Hynning, Balance-ofPayments Controls By the United States, 2 INT' LAW. 400 (1968) ; Kingson, Investment in Western Europe Under the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: Repatriation, Taxes and Borrowing, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1969) ; Morris, The New
Regulations Governing Direct Foreign Investment-An Early Appraisal, 23 Bus. LAW.
701 (1968) ; Scott, Tax aid Other Implications of the ForeignDirect Investment Regulations, 47 TAXES 32 (1969) ; Weeks, The Future of Investment Controls, 15 McGILL
L.J. 244 (1969) ; Note, Governmental Regulation of Foreign Investment, 47 TEXAS
L. REv. 421 (1969).
"1 When the Foreign Direct Investment Program was created, the Attorney
General gave his opinion that it was "a valid exercise of the authority conferred on
the President by section 5(b) [of the Trading with the Enemy Act]." Letter from
Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Secretary of Commerce Alexander Trowbridge,
Feb. 3, 1968, in CCH BAL. PAYm. REP. f[9031.
12 15 C.F.R. § 1000.313 (1970).
13
Id. § 1000.305.
14 Id. § 1000.304.
15 Id. § 1000.306(b).
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tions upon such transfers are expressed in terms of authorized annual
maximum amounts, described as "allowables." "6 The regulations provide that a direct investor may apply for a "specific authorization" "q
to permit him to exceed the amount of his annual allowables. If a
direct investor exceeds the amount of his annual allowables without
having obtained a specific authorization, the regulations permit OFDI
to negotiate an informal voluntary settlement 8 or to institute formal
administrative proceedings, 9 described as compliance proceedings, that
may result in an order requiring the direct investor to take appropriate
2
remedial action. 0
This article is concerned with the application of the Administrative
Procedure Act"' (APA) to the two major administrative processes
of OFDI: compliance proceedings and the determination of applications for specific authorizations. The questions that arise in measuring
these processes against the requirements of the APA search the nature
of fair administrative procedure.
II.

WHO

Is

THE "AGENCY" FOR PURPOSES OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT?

The APA applies to every "agency" that is a part of the federal
government. The question is whether the Secretary of Commerce or
the Director of OFDI is the agency for purposes of application of the
APA to the Foreign Direct Investment Program. The question is
of more than academic significance because only the person who is the
agency is permitted under the APA to combine investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions. If the Director is the agency,
he may participate in all phases of OFDI's operations, consistent with
due process limitations. But if the Secretary of Commerce is the
agency, the Director must circumscribe his participation so that he
does not commingle functions.
A. Applicability of the APA Generally
One issue may be put to rest at the outset: the authority that
administers the Foreign Direct Investment Program-whether it is
16 Id. §§ 1000.503, .504, .506.
17 Id. §§ 1000.316, .801.
18 Id. §§ 1025.211-221.

19 Id. §§ 1030.111-521.
20

Id. § 1030.514.

The numbering of individual sections of the APA was changed during the process of amendment and codification in 1966 and 1967. Most commentators have continued, however,
to refer to the more familiar section numbers that appeared in the original enactment.
The references in this article are to those section numbers, even when changes have
been made in the statutory language.
21 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. V, 1970).
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finally determined to be the Secretary of Commerce or the Director of
OFDI-is not excepted from compliance with the requirements of the
APA.
Although section 2 of the APA ' specifically excepts a number of
governmental bodies from the Act's reach, none of the exceptions
remotely covers the Department of Commerce or OFDI. The APA
provides no other express exceptions from its coverage. Conventional
rules of statutory construction would dictate that courts create no further exceptions. This result is underscored by section 12 of the APA
which provides that even a subsequent statute "may not be held to
supersede or modify this subchapter . . . except to the extent that it

does so expressly." ' And because, as the Supreme Court said in
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, one of the primary purposes of the
APA was "to introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies" of the
federal government, courts are unlikely, for fear of defeating this purpose, to create exceptions beyond those that the APA makes express.
That the Foreign Direct Investment Program may involve foreign
policy considerations will not by itself exempt the agency administering
it from complying with the APA. The draftsmen of the APA understood that foreign policy considerations might sometimes make application of certain of its provisions difficult or unwise. Section 4 exempts
rulemaking from the provisions of the APA "to the extent that there
is involved- (1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United
States." " Section 5 exempts adjudications from the provisions of
the APA "to the extent that there is involved . . . (4) the conduct

of military or foreign affairs functions." 26 These carefully drafted
exceptions suggest that Congress intended general application of the
APA, subject only to individual instances of exemption when foreign
affairs functions become implicated in particular proceedings.2 7 This
conclusion is supported by a sentence appearing in the Senate report
issued when the APA was passed: "The phrase 'foreign affairs functions,' used here and in some other provisions of the bill, is not to be
loosely interpreted to mean any function extending beyond the borders
of the United States but only those 'affairs' which so affect relations
U.S.C. §551(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
23 Id.§ 559.
225

24
25
2

339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
U.S.C. § 553(a) (Supp. V, 1970).

6Id.§ 554(a).

27 Cf. United States v. Aarons, 310 F2d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1962); Timberg,
Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the Individual in International Economic Regulation, 17 AD. L. REv. 159 (1965). But see Note, Foreign
Direct Investment Controls, 11 HARv. INT'L L.J. 490, 542-44 (1970).
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with other governments that, for example, public rulemaking provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international consequences." ' A substantially identical sentence appears in the House
report. 9
Prior to 1966, the APA excluded from its reach "functions which
by law expire on the termination of present hostilities." '0 At one
time it may have been arguable that this phrase included functions
brought into being by national emergencies, as the Attorney General
appears to have argued, 3 ' although it should be noted that the Foreign
Direct Investment Program is not based upon the national emergency
created by World War II (the "present hostilities" intended by the
1946 Congress that passed the APA), but rather upon a national
emergency declared in 1950.32 In any event, the revision of the APA
in 1966 resulted in the deletion of the phrase "functions which by law
expire on the termination of present hostilities." The Reviser's Notes
explain that the phrase was omitted "as executed." "
The APA will apply, then, to the agency that administers the
Foreign Direct Investment Program, whether it be the Secretary of
Commerce or the Director of OFDI. Parenthetically, this conclusion
may provide a possible ground for a court to reject arguments against
the substantive legality of the Foreign Direct Investment Program
because the procedural safeguards of the APA apply to its administration.
B. Legislative History of Section 2
Section 2 of the APA provides that " 'agency' means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency . .
. " ' This definition, as Professor Davis has written, "is not very satisfactory." " If
read literally, it would confer agency status on persons low in the
governmental hierarchy who might plausibly claim to be authorities of
the United States (for example, passport clerks, meat inspectors, and
forest rangers). Congress could not have intended to confer agency
status so broadly. The problem is to make functional sense of section
28S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945).
29 H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946).
30 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (Supp. V, 1970).
3
1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 11-12
(1947)

[hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].

Proclamation No. 2914, Dec. 16, 1950, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C.
App. § 1 (1964).
33 5 U.S.C. § 551 (Supp. V, 1970).
34 Id. § 551 (a).
35 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.01, at 1 n.1 (1958) [hereinafter
32

cited as K.

DAvis].
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2's use of the term "agency" in a manner consistent with Congress'
intention in passing the APA.
Because the statutory language is unclear, the process of interpretation must begin with an examination of the legislative history.
The basic legislative history of the APA resides in the reports of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary Committee of the
79th Congress, which passed the Act. These reports are particularly
significant because these two committees were the principal draftsmen
of the APA.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, in a committee print issued in
June 1945, explained why "agency" had been defined by use of the
broad word "authority":
It is necessary to define agency as "authority" rather than by
name or form, because of the present system of including one
agency within another or of authorizing internal boards or
"divisions" to have final authority. "Authority" means any
officer or board, whether within another agency or not, which
by law has authority to take final and binding action with or
without appeal to some superior administrative authority.
Thus "divisions" of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the so-called Schwellenbach Officer of the Department of Agriculture would be "agencies" within this definition. Any other
form of definition would raise serious difficulties in several
Federal agencies."8
The final report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, issued in
November 1945, also included an analysis of the defining language of
the proposed statute:
The word "authority" is advisedly used as meaning
whatever persons are vested with powers to act (rather than
the mere form of agency organization such as department,
commission, board, or bureau) because the real authorities
may be some subordinate or semidependent person or persons
within such form of organization. In conferring administrative powers, statutes customarily do not refer to formal agencies (such as the Department of Agriculture) but to specified
persons (such as the Secretary of Agriculture). Boards or
commissions usually possess authority which does not extend
to individual members or to their subordinates.37
The report of the House Judiciary Committee, issued in May
1946, included a single paragraph of explanation of the use of the
term "agency":
38
6 STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79Tr CoNG., IST SESS., REPORT ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 13 (Comm. Print 1945).
37 S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1945).
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Whoever has the authority is an agency, whether within
another agency or in combination with other persons. In
other words agencies, necessarily, cannot be defined by mere
form such as departments, boards, etc. If agencies were defined by form rather than by the criterion of authority, it
might result in the unintended inclusion of mere "housekeeping" functions or the exclusion of those who have the real
power to act.38
A further source that may be helpful in ascertaining Congress'
intention in passing section 2 is the Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative ProcedureAct, issued in 1947. The Manual states:
This definition was adopted in recognition of the fact that the
Government is divided not only into departments, commissions, and offices, but that these agencies, in turn, are further
subdivided into constituent units which may have all the attributes of an agency insofar as rule making and adjudication
are concerned. For example, the Federal Security Agency is
composed of many authorities which, while subject to the
overall supervision of that agency, are generally independent
in the exercise of their functions. Thus, the Social Security
Administration within the Federal Security Agency is in complete charge of the Unemployment Compensation provisions
of the Social Security Act. By virtue of the definition contained in Section 2 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the Social Security Administration is an agency, as is its
parent organization, the Federal Security Agency.3 9
A later Attorney General, who participated in drafting the Freedom
of Information Act provisions that became section 3 of the APA,40
subsequently issued a memorandum describing the agencies to which
the new section-and hence the whole of the APA-applied:
By its first two words ["Every agency"], the introductory clause of the enactment makes it clear at the outset that
its requirements are to apply to every department, board,
commission, division, or other organizational unit in the
executive branch. This results from the definition of the
term "agency" in Section 2 (a) of the APA as "each authority
of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
41
within or subject to review by another agency" ....
These few paragraphs comprise essentially all of the legislative
history specifically directed to the meaning of section 2's defining lan38

H.R.

3 9

REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946).
ATORNEY GENERAi's MANUAL 9-10.

40

5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1970).

4 1

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 4 (1967).
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guage. Fragmentary though they are, they suggest, in Justice Frankfurter's helpful phrase, "the known temper of legislative opinion." '
The theme that runs through the legislative history of section 2
is that an administrative agency is a part of government which is
"generally independent in the exercise of [its] functions" and which
"by law has authority to take final and binding action" affecting the
rights and obligations of individuals, particularly by the characteristic
procedures of rulemaking and adjudication.
This theme is consistent with the general conclusion of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, which "regarded as the distinguishing feature of an 'administrative' agency the
power to determine, either by rule or by decision, private rights and
obligations." " It is consistent with Professor Davis' general conclusion that an "administrative agency is a governmental authority,
other than a court and other than a legislative body, which affects the
44
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking."
If the legislative history on this point can be said to reflect a
dominant "temper of legislative opinion," it is a desire to use the term
"agency" to identify centers of gravity of the exercise of administrative
power. Where a center of gravity lies, where substantial "powers to
act" with respect to individuals are vested, there is an administrative
agency for purposes of the APA.
The legislative materials indicate an intention to move beyond
formal designations and charts of departmental organization to assess
the realities of the exercise of administrative power. Thus, the title of
the authority in question, whether it be "agency" or "board" or
"bureau" or "office" or "department," is irrelevant to assessing the
power it exerts. Similarly, the fact that an authority of government
is "within" or "subject to the overall supervision of [another] agency"
will not necessarily deprive it of the independence associated with
agency status. If an authority is in "complete charge" of a program,
it is an agency with respect to that program, despite its subordinate
position in a larger departmental hierarchy. As the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure had said, "That term [agency]
may appropriately be applied to subdivisions of departments-variously
termed 'bureaus,' 'offices,' 'services,' and the like-which have a substantial measure of independence in the departments' internal organiza42F. FRANKFURTEa,

The Reading of Statutes, in OF LAW AND MEN

44,

61

(P. Flman ed. 1956).
43

FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERne's CommITrEE ON ADmINISTRATIVE
S. Dc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
ATroRFqy GENERAL'S FINAL REPORT].
PRoCED RE,

44 1 K. DAvis

§ 1.01, at 1.
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tion and in the conduct of their adjudicatory or rule-making activities." 45
Perhaps more important, the legislative history indicates that the
fact that an authority's actions are subject to appeal to and review
by "some superior administrative authority" will not necessarily deprive
them of the conclusive character associated with agency status under
the APA. Nor will the fact that the authority exercises its power
"in combination with other persons" necessarily deprive it of the
agency status intended by the APA. The "criterion of authority" by
which the APA measures agency status does not require that an agency
exercise its power with complete independence, either vertically (in
terms of being subject to administrative review) or horizontally (in
terms of being required to act in concert with others).
What the legislative history of section 2 seems to teach, then, is
that Congress, in using the term "agency," intended the APA to apply
to authorities of government which are the center of gravity for the
exercise of substantial power against individuals.
Several caveats are necessary. First, a definition stated thus
broadly is not self-applying. It is an abstract proposition that does
not neatly decide concrete cases. Its usefulness lies in the fact that
it indicates a mood; it does not require a result. Second, particular
sentences and phrases appearing in the legislative history cannot be
read literally without doing violence to good sense and sound administrative practice. They suggest Congress' intention that "agency" be
given a liberal as opposed to a restricted interpretation, but they are
susceptible, if good sense and sound practice are ignored, of application
in a manner that would create inappropriate and incongruous results.
Third, if statutory interpretation, as Judge Learned Hand said, is "the
art of proliferating a purpose," 46 it would be shortsighted to draw the
purpose of the APA only from the legislative history of section 2. The
conclusions suggested by the legislative history of section 2 must be
placed in the context of the purposes underlying passage of the APA
as a whole.
In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,47 the Supreme Court pointed
to two of the several purposes of the APA.

The first purpose--"to

introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies" of the federal government-is not relevant to the present inquiry; the APA will apply
to whichever authority is determined to be the agency. But the second
45

ATTORNEY GENEral's FnmAL REPoRT 7.

46Brooklyn Nat'l Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946).
4-7339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
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purpose mentioned by the Court-"to curtail and change the practice
of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and
judge"-is highly relevant to interpreting the meaning of section 2's
use of the term "agency."
Prior to the passage of the APA, a generation of commentators
had described the unwholesome consequences that resulted from the
combination of investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions
in a single person or agency.48 The Court in Wong Yang Sung
devoted a major part of its opinion to reciting the consistent conclusions of those who had studied the problem that it was imperative that
Congress "ameliorate the evils [resulting] from the commingling of
functions." 49

Congress' particularized response to what was recognized by 1946
as a pervasive evil is of great significance. Section 5 of the APA
provides that "[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not,
in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision,
recommended decision, or agency review .

.

. except as witness or

counsel in public proceedings." " As the Court noted in Wong Yang
Sung, however, "[t]he Administrative Procedure Act did not go so
far as to require a complete separation of investigating and prosecuting
functions from adjudicating functions." 5' Section 5 goes on to provide
that the prohibition against combination of functions "does not apply
(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body
comprising the agency." 52
Thus, although Congress imposed a wide prohibition on the combination of functions, the practical necessity of holding members of
an agency responsible for administration of a coordinated program
prevented Congress from applying the prohibition against the agency
itself. Of all of the members of the federal administrative establishment, only the agency, which had the ultimate responsibility for the
effective exercise of administrative power, would be permitted to
commingle functions.
These facts suggest the importance that Congress attached to the
elimination of the combination of functions generally and the necessity
that Congress perceived of creating an exception at the agency level
alone. Congress' use of the term "agency" in section 2 must be read,
48

See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

40 (1937);

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FINAL REPORT 56; Nathanson, Separation of Functions Within Federal Administrative Agencies, 35 ILL. L. REv. 901 (1941).

49 339 U.S. at 46.
50 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)

51339 U.S. at 46.

525

(Supp. V, 1970).

U.S.C. § 554(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
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then, in the light of the resolution it made in section 5 of the combination of functions problem.
A definition of "agency" turning upon only the exercise of substantial authority would reach a number of second-level employees,
such as division chiefs, in any government office. To confer agency
status on such employees would be to permit them to commingle functions, a result contrary to Congress' intention to limit the persons
who may engage in that practice to those exercising authority at the
highest level only. Conversely, a definition of "agency" turning upon
only formal retention of supervisory authority would often confer
agency status in executive departments upon cabinet members alone.
To limit agency status to cabinet members would be to deny the
necessary authority to commingle functions to those below cabinet level
who are responsible in every real sense for the effective administration
of a program.
C. Judicial Decisions
The legislative history of section 2 and the purposes of Congress
in enacting a general prohibition against the combination of functions
acquire a special prominence because of the paucity of judicial decisions
on the meaning of "agency." Only two cases appear to have decided
in proceedings which contested the point whether a particular authority
of government was an agency for purposes of the APA.
In Larche v. Hannah/3 the district court held that the Civil Rights
Commission was an agency within the meaning of the APA and
therefore was required to grant witnesses appearing at its investigative
hearings section 5 rights of notice and section 7 rights of crossexamination. The only reasons that court gave for its holding were
these:
It performs quasi-judicial functions in its hearings, its fact
findings, its studies of "legal developments constituting a
denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution", and its appraisal of "the laws and policies of the Federal
Government" in the same respect. It "adjudicates" by its
rulings upon the admissibility of evidence at its hearings and
by its determinations of what is or is not the truth in matters before it. Thus we think that the Commission is subject
to the provisions of .
.
Act ....

.

.

the Administrative Procedure

The court based its finding that the Civil Rights Commission was
an agency upon the conclusion that it had the authority to adjudicate.
53

4

176 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. La, 1959).
Id. at 796-97.
M

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND OFDI

1970]

This conclusion was rejected by the Supreme Court, which said, in
reversing on other grounds, that the Commission's "function is purely
investigative and fact-finding. It does not adjudicate." 5 The Court
therefore held that because "the Civil Rights Commission performs
none of the functions [adjudication and rulemaking] specified in"
sections 5 and 7, their requirements did not apply to its investigatory
hearings. 6 The Court did not decide whether the Commission was
an "agency" within the meaning of section 2.
In Adams v. Witmer,5 7 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the Bureau of Land Management was an agency for purposes
of the APA. The difficulty is that the court did not attempt to
rationalize its holding or to describe its understanding of what the
term "agency" means. Its failure in these respects is surprising because
several characteristics of the Bureau would seem to invite discussion:
the Director is appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, rather than
by the President; the Director reports to an Assistant Secretary of
the Interior; and decisions of the Director are subject to appeal to the
Secretary. For this reason, the decision is of small value as precedent
and as instruction in the meaning of "agency."
No other judicial decisions offer guidance in defining "agency"
for APA purposes.5
D. Administration of OFDI
By Department Order 184-A, the Secretary of Commerce delegated to the Director of OFDI "the functions, authorities, and responsibilities" with respect to foreign direct investment that he had received
by executive order from the President.59 The language of the Department Order provided that the delegation was made "subject to such
policies, limitations, and directions as the Secretary may prescribe."
The Director was authorized to redelegate "subject to such conditions
and limitations as the Secretary may deem desirable." The Department Order further provided that the Director "report and be responsible to the Secretary," "[a]dminister the regulations issued by the
Secretary," "[p]rovide advice and assistance to the Secretary," and
"[p]rovide a basis for policy formulation of the Department [of Commerce] with respect to direct investment abroad and related matters."
55

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441 (1960).

56 Id. at 453.
57271 F,2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958).
8
r1
See McEachern v. United States, 321 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Hurley v.
Reed, 288 F.2d 844, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Soucie v. DuBridge, 39 U.S.L.W. 2123
(D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1970); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Udall, 192 F. Supp. 626,
630 (D.D.C. 1961).
59 33 Fed. Reg. 54 (1968).
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The terms of the delegation thus reserve a degree of authority in
the Secretary. To ascertain the relevance of that reservation to the
determination of who is the agency, it is important to analyze carefully
the nature of the authority reserved and to compare it closely with
the functional realities of the Foreign Direct Investment Program.
The requirements that the Director of OFDI "report and be
responsible to the Secretary" and act "subject to such policies, limitations, and directions as the Secretary may prescribe" are not decisive.
First, supervision by a cabinet member is common, if not implicit, in
the creation of an office within the executive department which he
heads.6" Second, the right of the delegator to take back some of his
authority is implicit in any delegation. Even absent the explicit
reservations appearing in the Department Order, the Secretary would
retain the right subsequently to impose limitations upon the Director's
exercise of the delegated authority.
The Secretary's reservation of authority is less important than
how he has exercised it. The Secretary has not formally prescribed
any substantive policies, limitations, or conditions to govern the Director's administration of the Foreign Direct Investment Program. No
regulation requires the Director to consult with the Secretary. In
terms of day-to-day operations and of policy formulation, the Director
independently exercises "the functions, authorities, and responsibilities"
which the Secretary delegated to him. The Director is in charge of
the staff and makes almost all of the policy decisions which administration of OFDI requires. It is the Director who decides whether the
agency should grant or deny applications for specific authorizations,
one of OFDI's most important functions. It is the Director who in
practice exercises final responsibility for the content of OFDI's regulations. It is the Director, or a person acting on his behalf, who decides
whether to begin an investigation of a direct investor, whether to
accept a consent settlement, and whether to bring a compliance proceeding. In these areas, where matters of administration and policy
intersect, the Director has made his determinations independent of
the Secretary.
In some respects, however, the Director lacks similar independence.
First, he does not participate directly in the fundamental decision of
the amount of annual allowables, which is made by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments. 6 Because the Secretary is a member
60 See, e.g., Dep't of Commerce Order No. 117-A, 31 Fed. Reg. 8087 (1966)
(Maritime Administration).
61 For an illustration of the work of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of
Payments, see Letter from Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman
of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, to Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 17,
1968, CCH BAL. PAYM. REP. 9095.
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of the Cabinet Committee, he plays a greater part in this decisionmaking process than the Director. Second, the Director's decisions
to deny a specific authorization are appealable to the Foreign Direct
Investment Appeals Board,62 named by the Secretary, and decisions
of hearing officers in compliance cases are not appealed to the Director
but go directly to the Department of Commerce Appeals Board,6 3 also
named by the Secretary. Because no compliance cases have been
brought, no appeals have been taken to the Department of Commerce
Appeals Board. Although its power to reverse the decision of a hearing
officer is limited," the Appeals Board does participate in adjudicatory
decisions by authority of the Department of Commerce.
The requirements in Department Order 184-A that the Director
"[p]rovide advice and assistance to the Secretary" and "[p]rovide a
basis for policy formulation of the Department with respect to direct
investment abroad and related matters" impose informational duties
upon the Director. They give expression to the fact that the Secretary
is the head of the executive department in which OFDI is located and
that he has wide responsibilities with respect to international commerce.
They do not indicate the actual exercise of authority within OFDI.
Finally, the Department Order requires that the Director "[a]dminister the regulations issued by the Secretary." Some of OFDI's
regulations have been signed by the Secretary, including, of course,
the initial regulations issued simultaneously with the President's Execu6215 C.F.L § 1000.802(c) (1) (1970).
63
6

Id. § 1035.102(a).

4Id. § 1035.108 (a).
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tive Order and those subsequent regulations thought to enlarge or
clarify the powers of the Director. The rest of OFDI's regulations
have been signed by the Director. These facts suggest that the Department Order did not mean to limit the authority to issue regulations
to the Secretary alone.
E. Analysis and Conclusion
Measured by the "criterion of authority" that the legislative history
suggests as the test of agency status, the facts indicate the basis for
arguing that the Director is the agency. In terms of operational
realities, the Director has been primarily responsible for the actual
exercise of authority in the administration of the Foreign Direct
Investment Program. He has acted independently in granting and
denying applications for specific authorizations, in issuing substantive
regulations, in authorizing investigations, and in approving consent
settlements. These are actions which seriously affect the rights and
obligations of individuals. The Secretary's actual intervention in the
Director's exercise of authority has been minimal.
But the argument that the Director is the agency must take
account of the following considerations:
First, the Secretary issued OFDI's initial regulations and has
issued some subsequent regulations. It was, of course, necessary that
the Secretary issue the initial regulations if substantive regulation was
to begin at the time that the President announced his intention to
control foreign direct investment. The subsequent regulations issued
by the Secretary were intended to increase the substantive authority
of the Director by enlarging or clarifying the Secretary's original
delegation. Although the subsequent regulations may be regarded as
announcing rules affecting individuals, the Secretary's intention seems
to have been to transfer authority to the Director or to confirm authority
that he already possessed. The most recent practice suggests that
henceforth OFDI's regulations will be issued by the Director.
Second, the Director's decision to deny an application for a specific
authorization may be appealed to the Foreign Direct Investment Appeals Board, whose members are named by the Secretary. Because
a time element is important in many applications for specific authorizations, few appeals are likely to be taken. Moreover, the qualifying
language of section 2-"whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency"-suggests that an authority of government
may retain sufficient power and independence in the exercise of its
functions to be considered an agency despite the availability of reviewing mechanisms implying a subordinate position in a larger depart-
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mental hierarchy. The power of the Foreign Direct Investment
Appeals Board to reverse the Director's decisions is limited to instances
of "unusual hardship" or inconsistency with "the goals and objectives"
of the President's Executive Order." These grounds do not seriously
threaten the finality of the Director's decisions.
Finally, the Director does not participate directly in the important
determination of the amount of the annual allowables, although the
Secretary solicits his views and recommendations. The Secretary does
participate to the extent that he is a member of the Cabinet Committee
on Balance of Payments, but he too lacks the authority of independent
decision which characterizes agency status.
In the respects discussed so far, then, the Director is the center
of gravity for the exercise of governmental authority against individuals. Because he meets the criterion of the "power to act" independently, set down as the dominant theme in the legislative history,
the argument that he is the agency in these respects is persuasive.
The argument is difficult to sustain, however, with respect to
adjudication. Although the Director participates in the negotiation
and acceptance of consent settlements, he plays no part in the decision
of appeals in compliance proceedings. Under OFDI's regulations the
Department of Commerce Appeals Board, not the Director, hears
appeals from the decisions of hearing officers in such proceedings.
Section 2 provides that an authority of government may be an agency
even if it is "subject to review by another agency." If the Director
participated in the adjudicatory process to the extent of rendering a
decision subject to review, it might be argued that his authority was
not inconsistent with agency status for purposes of adjudication: on
similar facts, the court so held in Adams v. Witmer " with respect to
the Bureau of Land Management. The argument is difficult to make
when appeals bypass the Director entirely.
The Appeals Board, whose authority derives from the Secretary,
is authorized to "consider appeals by persons affected by . . . administrative actions taken pursuant to law and referred to the Board by
appropriate authority." " The Department Order provides that decisions by the Appeals Board "shall be final." OFDI's regulations
authorize the Appeal Board to make final administrative determinations
in respect to adjudicatory appeals and make no provision for appeal
to the Secretary from a decision of the Appeals Board." The Appeals
5
48
Id. § 1000.802(c) (1).

66271 F2d 29 (9th Cir. 1959).
6725 Fed. Reg. 2603 (1960).
O15 C.F.R. § 1035.102(a) (1970).
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Board thus has authority "to take final and binding" administrative
action in determining the rights of individuals.
The authority of an administrative agency to act by means of
adjudication is a powerful sanction for administering its program and
for enforcing its substantive regulations. Even if the negotiation and
acceptance of consent settlements is regarded as part of the adjudicatory
process, the heart of the process is the power to decide appeals. If the
"criterion of authority"-which the legislative history of section 2
suggests as the measure of agency status-is to be a meaningful standard
in this area, the agency must have the power to decide adjudicatory
appeals. Because the Appeals Board rather than the director has the
"real power to act," it follows that the Appeals Board is the agency
for purposes of adjudication.
The conclusion that the Director is the agency for some purposes
and the Appeals Board for others is more plausible than any of the
alternate possibilities.69 The Director is the center of gravity for the
exercise of the Foreign Direct Investment Program's rulemaking
authority; the Appeals Board is the center of gravity for the exercise
of its final adjudicatory authority.
This bifurcated arrangement-perhaps the result of inadvertence
or indirection in the drafting of OFDI's regulations-is not compelled
by any general principle of law. The Director could be made the
agency for purposes of adjudication as well by amending the regulations
to authorize him to hear adjudicatory appeals from decisions of hearing
officers in compliance proceedings.

III.

APPLICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
TO COMPLIANCE PROCEEDINGS

Section 5 of the APA applies "in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing." 7o If section 5 is applicable to a proceeding,
69 It is not unusual for an agency to possess authority to exercise certain functions
but to lack authority to exercise others. Thus, separate agencies participate in the
administration of the tax laws, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue

Service having only rulemaking authority, the Tax Court having only adjudicatory
authority. As Professors Gellhorn and Byse have pointed out, in speaking of the
wide range of federal administrative agencies,
some of them (like the Federal Trade Commission) have virtually no rulemaking power; others (like the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
of Labor) have virtually no adjudicatory power; some (like the workmen's
compensation agencies of most states) rarely investigate; others (like the
Social Security Administration) do no "prosecuting"; and still others (like
the Federal Communications Commission) judge few proceedings they themselves have initiated.
W. GELLHoRN & C. Bysz, AuMIxIsTRATIV- LAW, CASES AND CommENTS 1018-19
(4th ed. 1960).
70 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. V, 1970).
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sections 7 and 8 71 are also applicable. These sections supply the
statutory guidelines for adjudicatory proceedings.
It is clear that the "formal administrative proceedings" contemplated by OFDI's compliance regulations 2 are "case[s] of adjudication" within the meaning of section 5. Section 2 of the APA defines
adjudication as "agency process for the formulation of an order" 3
and order as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency
in a matter other than rulemaking but including licensing." 7 Compliance proceedings are adjudications because they are designed to
result in the formulation of an order rather than a rule. 5 In addition,
unlike rulemaking, they are directed at individual conduct in individual
cases and are "characterized by an accusatory flavor and may result
in disciplinary action." 76
A. "Required by Statute"
Section 5 applies only when an adjudication is "required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing." For this provision to become operative the asserted statutory
requirement of a hearing must be explicit. As the Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act states:
The legislative history makes clear that the word "statute"
was used deliberately so as to make sections 5, 7, and 8 applicable only where the Congress has otherwise specifically
required a hearing to be held. .

.

.

Mere statutory authori-

zation to hold hearings (e.g., "such hearings as may be
77
deemed necessary") does not constitute such a requirement.
This reading of the "required by statute" language has been followed
consistently by the courts. 8
It is necessary, then, to determine whether any language in the
Trading with the Enemy Act, or in Executive Order 11387, or in
Department Order 184-A can fairly be construed as requiring that
compliance proceedings be determined on the record after opportunity
for a hearing.
71Id. §§ 556, 557.
7215 C.F.R. § 1030.111-.521 (1970).
73 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (Supp. V, 1970).
741Id.

§ 551(6).
C.F.R. § 1030.514(b) (1970).

715
76 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 14.
"7Id.41 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
78 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F2d 267, 270 (4th Cir.

1965).
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Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act provides:
(1) During the time of war or during any other period
of national emergency declared by the President, the President
may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise,
and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe,
by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting,
or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency
or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition[,] holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States .

.

.

.

The language of section 5 (b) contains no indication, either explicit
or ambiguous, of a requirement of a hearing in connection with any
functions undertaken by the President pursuant to its authority. In
light of the wide and unusual national emergency powers granted to
the President, it would be surprising if Congress had placed procedural
requirements upon his exercise of them. 0
Executive Order 11387, by which the President set in motion
the procedures that led to the creation of OFDI, provides:
[1.] (b) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to require, as he determines to be necessary or appropriate to
strengthen the balance of payments position of the United
States, that [direct investors be made subject to certain
restrictions].
[3.] The Secretary of Commerce [is] authorized, under
authority delegated to [him] under this Order or otherwise
available to [him], to carry out the provisions of this Order,
and to prescribe such definitions for any terms used herein,
U.S.C. § 95a (1964).
8o Cf. Pike v. United States, 340 F2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Eisner, Administrative
Machinery and Steps for the Lawyer, 11 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 61, 64 (1945) ;
Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury, 11 LAW &
CONTEmp. PEoB. 17 (1945).
7912
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to issue such rules and regulations, orders, rulings, licenses
and instructions, and take such other actions, as [he] determines to be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes
of this Order. ....

"

Even if one assumes that the Executive Order has the force of
a statute, there is no indication in its language that the President
intended to require that hearing be held in connection with the exercise
of any of the authority that it delegates.
Finally, Department Order 184-A, whether or not it has the force
of a statute, imposes no hearing requirement upon the exercise of any
authority or function it delegates to the Director of OFDI.
The absence in the Trading with the Enemy Act, Executive Order
11387, and Department Order 184-A of explicit language requiring
a hearing in the determination of compliance proceedings means that
those proceedings are not adjudications "required by statute" within
the meaning of section 5 of the APA, unless-as the next paragraphs
explore-a hearing is constitutionally compelled.
B. Constitutional Requirement of a Hearing
Because of the decision of the Supreme Court in Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath,2 section 5 must be given a broader interpretation
than its words might literally suggest.
Wong Yang Sung involved a challenge to a deportation order
resulting from a hearing that had not complied with sections 5, 7, and
8 of the APA. The Government sought to justify the noncompliance
by arguing that because the Immigration Act contained no express
requirement of a hearing, deportation orders were not "required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing." The question was whether the Immigration Act was a
statute which made section 5 of the APA applicable. After concluding
that the "legislative history [of section 5] is more conflicting than the
text is ambiguous," ' the Court held:
But the difficulty with any argument premised on the
proposition that the deportation statute does not require a
hearing is that, without such hearing, there would be no constitutional authority for deportation. The constitutional requirement of procedural due process of law derives from the
same source as Congress' power to legislate and, where applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that body. It
81

1970).

FMxec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. §433 (1970),

82339 U.S. 33 (1950).
8

3Id. at 49.

12 U.S.C. § 95a (Supp. V,
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was under compulsion of the Constitution that this Court
long ago held that an antecedent deportation statute must provide a hearing at least for aliens who had not entered clandestinely and who had been here some time even if illegally.
The Court said:
"This is the reasonable construction of the acts of Congress here in question, and they need not be otherwise
interpreted. In the case of all acts of Congress, such
interpretation ought to be adopted as, without doing
violence to the import of the words used, will bring them
into harmony with the Constitution." The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101.
We think that the limitation to hearings "required by
statute" in § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act exempts
from that section's application only those hearings which
administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule, custom,
or special dispensation; not those held by compulsion. We
do not think the limiting words render the Administrative
Procedure Act inapplicable to hearings, the requirement for
which has been read into a statute by the Court in order to
save the statute from invalidity. They exempt hearings of
less than statutory authority, not those of more than statutory
authority. We would hardly attribute to Congress a purpose
to be less scrupulous about the fairness of a hearing necessitated by the Constitution than one granted by it as a matter
of expediency. 4
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have made clear that
Wong Yang Sung states a general statutory construction of section 5,
rather than an interpretation which may be limited by the fact that
deportation proceedings traditionally have been an area of constitutional solicitude. 5 The consequence is that an adjudicatory hearing
is "required by statute" and sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA are
applicable whenever the Constitution commands that a hearing be
provided.
The Supreme Court has most commonly announced a constitutional requirement that a trial-type hearing be held after determining
that the case in issue involved adjudicative rather than legislative
facts."6 "Adjudicative facts," as Professor Davis has written in summarizing this line of case development, "are the facts about the parties
and their activities, businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts
4

Id. at 49-50.
85 Cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); United States v. L.A. Tucker
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33 (1952) ; Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907
(1951), rev'g per curiam 96 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
86
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria Workers Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ; Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
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usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how,
why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the
kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do
not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which
help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." 87
Thus, in two early and leading cases, the Supreme Court held that a
"relatively small number of persons" were entitled constitutionally to
a hearing on the validity of tax assessments levied against them to
compensate the municipality for paving the street in front of their
homes, because each case turned upon individual grounds," but that
taxpayers had no constitutional right to a hearing when a taxing
authority raised the valuation of all taxable property generally, without
regard to individual cases.8 9
These principles make clear that a trial-type hearing is constitutionally compelled in compliance proceedings. These proceedings
are concerned with individual instances of possible violation of OFDI's
regulations. More important, they require finding of facts on such
individualized issues as willfulness and bad faith-adjudicative facts
which are "intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to
be determined without giving the parties a chance to know and to
meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them, that is, without
providing the parties an opportunity for trial [because] the parties
know more about the facts concerning themselves and their activities
than anyone else is likely to know, and the parties are therefore in
an especially good position to rebut or explain evidence that bears
upon adjudicative facts." 90
Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that "consideration of
what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature
of the government function involved as well as of the private interest
that has been affected by governmental action." " Direct investors
have important individual interests at stake in compliance proceedings.
As OFDI's regulations make clear, direct investors can be subjected
to orders that impose sanctions, whether they be regarded as remedial
or disciplinary.2 Thus, an order resulting from a compliance proceeding may require a direct investor to repatriate all or part of certain
871 K. DAVIs, supra note 35, at § 7.02, at 413; see H.

WADE, TovARDs ADMIN120 (1963).
Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
89
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
9o 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 35, at § 7.02, at 413.
91 Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
215 C.F.R. § 1030.514(c) (1970); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (Supp. V, 1970).
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foreign earnings or balances, or cause affiliated foreign nationals to
make transfers of capital to the direct investor." Such an order may
also "for 1 or more years withdraw all or part of respondent's general
authorizations or exemptions" and prohibit certain kinds of foreign
direct investment. 4 Orders including such terms obviously impose
restrictions upon a direct investor. They deny him privileges allowed
to others under the Foreign Direct Investment Program. These restrictions go beyond merely enjoining one who has violated the law
from violating it again, and in this respect are more severe than the
sanctions typically imposed by the Federal Trade Commission or the
National Labor Relations Board. When consequences similar to the
loss of such privileges have been involved, the protections afforded by
a trial-type hearing have been held most necessary. 95
These principles describing the constitutional requirement of a
hearing apply in all but a few exceptional cases. An administrative
hearing is not required when hearings are inferior as a method of
inquiry to inspection, examination, or testing,9 6 or when emergency
action of a temporary character is necessary to protect the public
interest, as when food is unfit " or drugs are mislabelled,98 or when
the conduct of a bank's officers is under investigation. 9 None of
these exceptions applies to compliance proceedings against direct investors. A trial-type hearing is the superior method of ascertaining
the facts and there is no obvious necessity for administrative action
in advance of the time required to conduct a hearing.
C. Foreign Affairs Functions
One final issue must be considered. OFDI exercises authority
that derives, ultimately, from the power of Congress and the President
in the area of foreign affairs. The power of the President with respect
to foreign affairs is obviously great. Its exercise traditionally has
been subject to fewer procedural safeguards than almost any other
legislative or executive power. The Supreme Court has recognized
93 15 C.F.R. § 1030.514(c) (1)
9d.

(1970).

§ 1030.514(c) (2).

95 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411 (1969); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963) ; Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1925) ; Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
96 See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 35, at § 7.09, and cases cited therein. See also
Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
97
North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) ; Adams
v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913).
98 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
09 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). See also Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (citing cases).
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that "within the international field Congress must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved." "o
"'We should long hesitate before limiting or embarrassing such
powers.' "101

The balance of payments crisis which led to the creation of the
Foreign Direct Investment Program was clearly in the area of foreign
affairs. The purpose of the Program was to reduce the proportions
of the crisis in the interest of strengthening the monetary position of
the United States vis-A-vis other countries. One of the premises upon
which the Program rests is that "[h]ard currency is a weapon in the
struggle between the free and the communist worlds." 102 The provision of the Trading with the Enemy Act under which the President
acted applies only "[d]uring the time of war or during any other
period of national emergency declared by the President." 103 Executive
Order 11387 requires the Secretary of State to advise the Secretary of
Commerce "with respect to matters under this Order involving foreign
policy." 104 Many of OFDI's substantive regulations-for example,
the schedules governing the amount of direct investment permissible
in particular countries 'o 5 -are related directly to the United States'
foreign policy goals in various parts of the world. Certainly the purpose and structure of the Foreign Direct Investment Program rest in
considerable part upon foreign policy considerations. The question is
whether these facts are sufficient to render section 5 of the APA
inapplicable to compliance proceedings.
The decision in Korematsu v. United States'0 0 sustains the exercise of extensive executive authority over individuals but, to the degree
that it has not been discredited by the judgment of history,-1 7 it rests
finally upon the existence of a war which threatened the nation's
10 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ; cf. United States v. Travis, 241 F. Supp. 468
(S.D. Cal. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 344 F2d 506 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 U.S. 491 (1967).
101 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936)
(quoting Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)) (italics by Court in CurtissWright omitted).
102 Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F2d 106, 112 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

385 U.S. 898 (1966). See also Teague v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F2d
441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977 (1969).
103 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1964).
104 Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. 433 (1970), 12 U.S.C. § 95a (Supp. V,
1970).
105 15 C.F.R. § 1000.319 (1970).
106319 U.S. 432 (1943).
107 See Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945), reprinted in E. RosTow, THE SovEREIGN PREROGATIVE 193 (1962).
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survival." 8 The national emergency and the balance of payments
crisis which resulted in the creation of the Foreign Direct Investment
Program cannot be regarded as fair equivalents of World War II.
There is expansive language in Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp. 9 sustaining the unreviewability
of the President's exercise of discretion in granting his approval, required by statute, of a CAB order which awarded an overseas air
route. The Court denied review because "the very nature of executive
decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions
.

.

.

. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.

They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil." :"' The decision
in Waterman differs from the present facts in two significant respects.
First, the decision which the Court was asked to review had been
made by the President himself, rather than by an agency which he
had created; the Court's reluctance to undertake such a review is
understandable. Second, the decision which the Court was asked to
review-whether a new airline route to a foreign country should be
established-may well have depended upon foreign policy considerations; such "delicate" and "complex" considerations are hardly likely
to be present in most compliance proceedings, in which the issues are
the more mundane ones of whether the direct investor exceeded his
allowables and, if he did, whether his action was taken in good faith.
The argument that compliance hearings may not have to comply
with the otherwise applicable constitutional requirement of a trial-type
hearing because OFDI exercises the plenary power of the President
and Congress over foreign affairs seems doubtful. It will be difficult
to persuade a court that the balance of payments crisis is a national
threat of the same order as World War II, or that a decision reached
by OFDI's administrative processes is entitled to the same freedom
from constitutional and statutory restraints as a decision of the President himself, or that an order entered in a compliance proceeding
raises issues of the same foreign policy sensitivity as those implicated
in an order granting an overseas air route.
Moreover, Congress has recognized that foreign policy considerations may arise in administrative proceedings and that it may be
inappropriate to require full compliance with the APA on such occasions. Section 5 of the APA (and hence sections 7 and 8) does not
08
'
See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944) ; Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944).

109 333 U.S. 103 (1948).

1OId. at 111; cf. Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F2d 833, 845-46
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
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apply "to the extent that there is involved . .

.

(4) the conduct of

military or foreign affairs functions." "' This language has not been
subject to serious judicial interpretation. But a fair reading-particularly in light of the "to the extent that" phrasing-suggests that
Congress did not intend totally to exclude an agency from application
of the APA merely because it may have been created to meet problems
related to the conduct of foreign policy or may have been assigned
tasks whose achievement has foreign policy implications. 1 2 Rather,
Congress seems to have intended that the APA apply to adjudications
such as compliance proceedings conducted by agencies such as OFD1
except "to the extent that" a particular proceeding would interfere with
the conduct of foreign affairs functions and, as two Congressional
committees said, "clearly provoke definitely undesirable international
consequences."

113

The decision of most compliance proceedings will not interfere
with the conduct of foreign affairs functions and probably will not
even implicate foreign policy considerations. Courts are likely to
regard such proceedings as presenting routine instances of the administrative necessity to regulate by sanctions and remedies. One can
imagine particular cases presenting challenges to OFDI regnlations
that rest upon foreign policy judgments, and in such cases the exemption in section 5 may become relevant. Similarly, compliance cases
may sometimes threaten information which the Government regards as
privileged, but there are evidentiary rules to deal with that possibility." 4
The fact that Congress has created an exemption for proceedings
that would interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs functions indicates its sensitivity to the prerogatives of the President in such matters.
Because Congress has supplied a responsible resolution of the competing interests involved, it is unlikely that a court would hold that
OFDI's compliance proceedings are entitled to greater immunity from
the constitutional requirements of a trial-type hearing than section 5
provides.
D. Conclusion
Because compliance proceedings present issues of adjudicative fact
that the Constitution requires be determined at trial-type hearing, they

"'5 U.S.C. § 554(4) (Supp. V, 1970).

112See United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F2d 371,
375 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Timburg, supra note 27.
"13 S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946) ; see text accompanying notes 22-33 mtpra.
"14 See

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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are an "adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing" and thus are subject to the
procedural requirements of sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA.

IV. THE

ROLE OF THE HEARING EXAMINER IN COMPLIANCE
PROCEEDINGS

OFDI's regulations provide that compliance proceedings "shall
be presided over by an individual designated by the Director of the
Office" and that the individual named "shall not be employed by the
Office in any investigative or prosecuting function, and shall not be
subject to the supervision of the Director of the Compliance Division
in any way."

115

A. Designation of a Presiding Officer
It has earlier been concluded that compliance proceedings are
"case[s] of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing" within the meaning
of section 5 of the APA. When section 5 applies to an administrative
proceeding, so does section 7, which provides that only the "agency,"
or one of its members, or a hearing examiner selected by the Civil
Service Commission "shall preside at the taking of evidence" in
adjudications." 6 OFDI's regulations would permit the designation as
hearing officers of individuals who are neither the agency, nor members
of the agency, nor hearing examiners selected by the Civil Service
Commission." 7 In this respect they are inconsistent with section 7
and therefore invalid.
If the Department of Commerce Appeals Board is the agency for
purposes of adjudication, as has been concluded earlier, section 7
would permit one of its members to serve as the presiding officer at
compliance hearings. Because of the significant responsibilities that
members of the Appeals Board already carry, this alternative is impracticable.
If OFDI's regulations are amended to place adjudicatory appeals
in the Director so that he becomes the agency for purposes of adjudication, section 7 would permit him to serve as the presiding officer at
compliance hearings. Although this alternative may seem valuable in
particular cases, its wisdom is doubtful as a regular practice.
Serving as the presiding officer in compliance proceedings may
turn out to be a time-consuming job. A presiding officer must par.15 15 C.F.R. § 1030.431(a)
-16

(1970).

5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (Supp. V, 1970).

"17 15 C.F.R. § 1030A31(a)

(1970).
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ticipate in the conference stages preceding the hearing, conduct the
hearing itself, perhaps over an extended period of time, and .prepare a
report embodying his findings of fact and conclusions of law. If the
volume of adjudications is great, the Director could be required to
spend a significant part of his time on compliance hearings. Furthermore, by tradition and necessity, the presiding officer at adjudicatory
hearings should be a lawyer, and it is likely that the Director of
OFDI will sometimes be a person not trained in law.
Moreover, the person who is the agency usually does not serve
as the presiding officer at adjudicatory hearings; the use of independent,
impartial hearing examiners, trained by the Civil Service Commission,
is overwhelmingly the norm in federal adminstrative proceedings. For
the Director to serve as the presiding officer would create substantial
doubts as to the fairness of the proceedings-for example, with respect
to his ability to consider objectively challenges to the validity of OFDI
regulations. It also might raise the question whether a person regularly engaged in the routine work of presiding at hearings is entitled
to be regarded as the agency for purposes of adjudication.
It would therefore seem wise in the generality of cases to designate
a hearing examiner selected by the Civil Service Commission as the
presiding officer at compliance proceedings. Such a practice need not
preclude the possibility of service by the Director in cases of the most
unusual nature.
B. Waiver of a Hearing Examiner
The question has been raised whether OFDI should amend its
regulations to give the Director the authority under some circumstances to designate a senior attorney in the Chief Counsel's office to
serve as the presiding officer at compliance hearings in place of an
APA section 11 hearing examiner. Two circumstances, for example,
in which the regulations might give the Director such authority
would be: (1) when the direct investor does not request the designation of a section 11 hearing examiner within a specified period of
days, perhaps 20 or 30, after being informed in a notice served with
the complaint in the compliance proceeding that failure to do so will
result in a waiver of the right; (2) when the direct investor and the
Director stipulate to the substitution of an OFDI attorney for a section
11 hearing examiner as the presiding officer.
The possibility that an agency may provide for waiver of a
section 11 hearing examiner is raised by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.118 In that case
118344 U.S. 33 (1952).
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the ICC had granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity
to a trucker, over the objection of competitors, after a hearing conducted by a trial examiner who had not been appointed pursuant to
section 11, the ICC taking the position that the hearing was not
subject to the formal hearing requirements of the APA. Subsequent
to the hearing, in Riss & Co. v. United States,"9 the Supreme Court
held that such hearings were governed by the APA and that failure
to appoint a section 11 hearing examiner constituted reversible error.
The contention in Tucker that the ICC's action was invalid because
a hearing examiner had not been appointed pursuant to section 11 was
raised for the first time in the district court, no objection having been
taken at the hearing.
The Supreme Court dismissed the contention on the ground that
no objection had been made in the administrative proceeding. The
decision in Riss & Co., it said, "established only that a litigant in
such a case as this who does make such demand at the time of hearing is
entitled to an examiner chosen as the Act prescribes." 120 The decision
in Tucker thus is tied closely to the orthodox rule that a court will
not consider objections to the validity of an administrative proceeding
if the objections were not raised at the proceeding itself.
The decision is also tied closely to the facts of the case. In considering the competing truck line's failure to object to the status of
the hearing officer, the Court noted:
The apparent reason for complacency was that it was
not actually prejudiced by the conduct or manner of appointment of the examiner. There is no suggestion that he exhibited bias, favoritism or unfairness. Nor is there ground
for assuming it from the relationships in the proceeding. He
did not act and was not expected to act both as prosecutor
and judge. The Commission, which appointed him, did not
institute or become a party in interest to the proceeding.
Neither it nor its examiner had any function except to decide
justly between contestants in an adversary proceeding. 2 '
In addition, the ICC's omission of an APA hearing examiner was
in the nature of a good faith judgment that happened to be in error.
Moreover, the Court noted that "in about five thousand cases commenced after the effective date of the Administrative Procedure Act,
orders are for an indefinite period vulnerable to attack if no timely
objection during the administrative process is required." "2 In com119 341 U.S. 907 (1951), rev'g per curiam 96 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
120 344 U.S. at 36.

121 1d. at 35-36.
= Id. at 37 n.7.
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menting upon how closely Tucker is tied to its facts, Professor Jaffe
has written, "In these licensing cases the ICC plays no prosecutory
part. Furthermore, the interest of competitors opposing a new license
is a peripheral one. The ICC procedure was of long standing prior
to the APA and had evoked little or no objection. The waiver did
not involve a significant forfeiture of procedural protection." M2
Because of the factual context in which it arose, the decision in
Tucker cannot be read as authorizing the routine substitution, by
intentional design, of agency employees for section 11 hearing examiners. There is no indication that the Court intended any compromise
of the view, expressed in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, that the
intention that hearings be conducted by "examiners whose independence and tenure are so guarded by the Act as to give the assurances
of neutrality which Congress thought would guarantee the impartiality
of the administrative process" 14 was perhaps the primary motivating
impulse behind passage of the APA, a view reaffirmed in Ramspeck
v. Federal Trial Enaminers Conference. 5
To these concerns must be added the requirement of section 12
of the APA that a "subsequent statute may not be held to supersede
or modify [the APA] . . . except to the extent that it does so
expressly." 126 In Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v. Christenberry,2
the court held invalid an attempt by the Postmaster General to delegate
his hearing functions to the Judicial Officer of the Department pursuant to a statutory provision authorizing him to delegate to subordinates "such of his functions as he deems appropriate." "The provisions for the appointment of impartial, independent Hearing Examiners
are the very heart and soul of the Administrative Procedure Act,"
the court said, "and variations therefrom should not be countenanced
except where a statute expressly provides for a Hearing Examiner
appointed in another manner." 1" The court found that the statutory
language upon which the Postmaster General relied was inadequate
to meet the requirement of section 12.'9
The decision in Borg-Johnson has been made subject to at least
one qualification. In Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,130 another

I3

ADmixhISTRATIVE AcTio N 457 (1967).
U.S. 33, 52 (1950).
U.S. 128, 131-32 (1953) ; see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951); Note, The Status of the Trial Examiner in Administrative Agencies,
66 H.Av. L. REv. 1065 (1953).
126 5 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. V, 1970) ; cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
127 169 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
12S Id. at 753.
:12 In 1962, an express statutory provision was enacted authorizing the Judicial
Officer to become the agency for purposes of the APA, to the extent that such
functions are delegated to him by the Postmaster General. 39 U.S.C. § 308a (1964).
130 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).

L. JAFf=, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF

124339
125 345
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judge of the same court, writing six months later, said in a footnote,
"The Judicial Officer [of the Post Office Department] heard the case
pursuant to a stipulation between the parties which had the .effect of
obviating the requirement that the case be heard by an independent
Hearing Examiner. See Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v. Christenberry .

. .

."

'31

In thus apparently approving the use of a stipulation

to waive appointment of a section 11 hearing examiner, the court did
not mention the "express exception" language of section 12 that had
been dispositive in Borg-Johnson. It shotild also be noted that the
decision in Grove Press is inconsistent with the view-almost certainly
held by many courts and argued by Justice Frankfurter in dissent in
Tucker-that because the requirement that administrative agencies use
independent, impartial hearing examiners is designed to assure public
confidence in the integrity of the administrative process, it "is not
something personal to a party" and "thus not within the dispensing
power of any litigant."

132

It is my conclusion that OFDI could not validly provide by
regulation that unless a direct investor requests the designation of a
section 11 hearing examiner within a specified period of days he will
be deemed to have waived the appointment of such an examiner and
consented to the use of a senior attorney from OFDI as the presiding
officer at the contemplated compliance proceeding. This conclusion
will obtain even if the regulation grants the direct investor an adequate
period of time in which to request the appointment of a section 11
hearing examiner and even if the notice sent to the direct investor
informs him adequately and frankly of the consequences of decision.
Several premises, drawn from the materials set out above, underlie
this conclusion.
First, the use of independent, impartial hearing examiners is a
fundamental aspect of the APA. It is designed to provide individuals
against whom an agency proceeds the substance and the appearance
of fairness and to assure the public of the integrity of the administrative
process. Nothing in the APA-which uses mandatory language in
providing that hearing examiners "shall preside at the taking of
evidence"-suggests that the right to a section 11 hearing examiner
can be waived or made dependent upon the timely request of the party
involved. In this respect, the APA's provision for hearing examiners
is different from the historical practices governing waiver of jury
trial in criminal cases. A regulation which placed the burden of
requesting the appointment of a section 11 hearing examiner upon a
131Id. at 491 n.3 (citation omitted).
132 344 U.S. at 39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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direct investor "could provide the vehicle by which [an agency] might
avoid entirely the Hearing Examiner provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act."

133

Second, the Director, assuming he is the agency, has the authority
to serve as the presiding officer at compliance proceedings. But his
right to delegate this authority to a subordinate who is not a section
11 hearing examiner depends upon the existence of statutory language
"expressly" indicating an intention of thus modifying the hearing
3
examiner requirement of the APA."'
There is no suggestion that
the Trading with the Enemy Act, Executive Order 11387, or Department Order 184-A contains such express language.
Third, a regulation providing as a matter of routine procedure
that a direct investor bear the burden of formally requesting the
appointment of a section 11 hearing examiner too readily suggests
that OFDI is attempting to gain an unfair advantage in a proceeding
in which it is the direct investor's adversary. It is unrealistic to
believe that an employee of OFDI will not be more committed to the
achievement of OFDI's substantive goals, and therefore less capable
of objective assessment of the direct investor's arguments, than a
section 11 hearing examiner. The decision in Tucker refused to set
aside an administrative proceeding in which an ICC employee improperly presided, but the Court noted that the case involved a dispute
between private parties and that the ICC "did not institute or become
a party in interest to the proceeding." 135 Any attempt to formalize
the possibility of substituting an OFDI employee for a section 11
hearing examiner will almost certainly strike a court as unfair and
inconsistent with the narrow exception tolerated in Tucker.
It is perhaps a closer question whether OFDI may by regulation
enable the direct investor and the Director to stipulate to the substitution of an OFDI attorney for a section 11 hearing examiner as the
presiding officer. Because such a regulation would not impose upon
the direct investor the burden of requesting what the APA appears
to give him as of right, it avoids some of the difficulties discussed
above. In addition, it can be expected that when such a regulation is
invoked, it will often result in the designation of a presiding officer
with greater competence in the substantive issues presented by compliance proceedings than a section 11 hearing examiner, perhaps
newly recruited to the area of international investment, might possess.
133 Borg-Johnson v. Christenberry, 169 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
134 Section 12 of the APA provides that a statute "may not be held to supersede

or modify this subchapter . . . except to the extent that it does so expressly."

5 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. V, 1970).
135 344 U.S. at 35-36.
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With the exception of the conclusory footnote sustaining this
practice in Grove Press,1 36 there is no case authority on the question.
Several concerns may arise, however, and they parallel some of the
difficulties discussed above:
First, the selection of a presiding officer by stipulation of the
parties has the appearance of the selection of an arbitrator. The
process may well result in the selection of a presiding officer acceptable
to the parties for any number of reasons-for example, because he is
available to hear the case at a much earlier date than a section 11
hearing examiner would be. But the process gives no assurance that
it will result in the selection of a presiding officer possessing the
qualities of independence and impartiality which are of primary concern to the APA.
Second, no statute "expressly" authorizes OFDI to modify the
general requirement of the APA that section 11 hearing examiners
preside at adjudicatory hearings.
Finally, in most cases it will be OFDI rather than the direct
investor that will be interested in stipulating to the substitution of
an OFDI employee for a section 11 hearing examiner. The fact that
OFDI has such an interest will not escape the notice of direct investors. At the same time, the direct investor, knowing that he must
continue to deal with OFDI after the compliance proceeding is completed, will have an interest in remaining on good terms with OFDI.
The coincidence of these interests means that a regulation permitting
the parties to stipulate to the selection of an OFDI employee as presiding officer may have an inevitably coercive effect in a direct investor's decision to forego his right to a hearing presided over by a
section 11 hearing examiner, no matter how circumspect OFDI may
be. Indeed, in view of the possibility that a direct investor might
believe that OFDI would refuse to grant applications for specific
authorizations from direct investors who have not settled their differences with the Compliance Division (whether or not this is true
would be irrelevant for these purposes), the coercive potential of such
a regulation is heightened.
This analysis may overstate the subtleties of coercion perhaps at
work in a direct investor's perception of a regulation permitting the
parties to stipulate to a hearing officer who is not a section 11 hearing
examiner. The fact is that OFDI deals almost exclusively with
sophisticated members of the business community who are represented
by counsel and are unlikely to be easily coerced into surrendering
rights they would prefer to retain.
13 6 See note 131 supra & accompanying text.
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But even accepting the assumption that the possibility of coercion
will be minimal, a regulation of the kind under consideration would
nevertheless fail to meet the other objections of omission of a section
11 hearing examiner noted above. Moreover, it may not be enough
to persuade a court that in fact the coercive effect of OFDI's regulation upon direct investors will be minimal. A court may well be
concerned with the potential for coercive effect that such regulations
are likely to have in other administrative contexts. A case-by-case
evaluation of a factor so evanescent as coercive effect "may raise
questions so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively only
by prohibitions not concerned with the fairness of a particular" application. 37 A court may be disposed to hold that the validity of a regulation permitting parties to stipulate to the omission of APA rights
depends as much upon what can happen under such a regulation as
upon what has happened in the particular case under review. 3 For
a court to conclude that in many imaginable applications such a regulation would exercise a coercive influence on the surrender of APA rights
would not be surprising.
C. Conclusion
It seems clear the OFDI's compliance proceedings must be presided over by a section 11 hearing examiner. A regulation requiring
a direct investor to request the designation of a section 11 hearing
examiner upon penalty of waiver is inconsistent with the purposes
of the APA. A regulation providing that the parties may stipulate
to the substitution of an OFDI employee for a section 11 hearing
examiner as the presiding officer at compliance proceedings would
probably be held invalid, although no decisions speak to this question.
V.

SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS AND DISQUALIFICATION

FOR BIAS

Adjudication is a primary function of administrative agencies.
The impartiality required for the proper performance of adjudicatory
functions is not always wholly consistent with the performance of
certain other administrative functions, such as investigating, prosecuting, and negotiating settlements. Section 5 (c) of the APA' 39
represents the balance struck by Congress in determining when the
combination of inconsistent administrative functions will be permitted
13

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943).

138See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass. 525, 95 N.E. 2d 666 (1950).
139 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)

(Supp. V, 1970).
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and when they should be separated to protect the judicial function
from inappropriate contamination:
Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte
matters as authorized by law, such an employee [the employee
who presides at the reception of evidence] may not(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless
on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate;
or
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision
or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the
performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for
an agency.
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may
not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise
in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel
in public proceedings. This subsection does not apply(C) to the agency or a member or members of the
body comprising the agency.
These statutory provisions must be read in the light of the case
law that has developed with respect to bias on the part of those performing adjudicatory functions. An agency decision rendered in compliance with the APA's strictures on separation of functions may
nevertheless be set aside as a denial of due process because the adjudicator was biased. The law in these two areas-separation of functions and bias-is obviously based on related considerations. For
purposes of clarity these areas will be considered separately, although
any suggestion that such a separation could be rigidly sustained would
be artificial.
A. Separation of Functions
Part II of this article analyzed the present administrative structure
of OFDI in light of the APA's definition of the term "agency." The
conclusions reached were that the Director is the agency for purposes
of rulemaking and that the Department of Commerce Appeals Board
is the agency for purposes of adjudication. Part IV concluded that
the APA requires OFDI to employ a section 11 hearing examiner as
the presiding officer at compliance hearings.
These conclusions present no.problems with respect to separation
of functions. Under OFDI's present administrative structure, appeals

1970]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND OFDI

in compliance proceedings go directly from the hearing examiner to
the Appeals Board, whose only function is adjudicative; it has no part
in the investigating, prosecuting, or negotiating of settlements functions of OFDI. If the present arrangements are retained, OFDI's
procedures for deciding adjudicatory appeals would be in compliance
with the separation of functions provisions of the APA.
The difficulty is that the present arrangements are highly impractical. They place the power of decision in compliance proceedings
entirely in the hands of persons-a section 11 examiner and the members of the Department of Commerce Appeals Board-not subject in
any substantive manner to the authority of the Director. Thus the
Director, who bears the primary responsibility for administering the
Foreign Direct Investment Program, is denied the opportunity to
participate in the performance of OFDI's adjudicatory functions.
From the standpoint of the development of substantive rules of law
by effective and flexible means of administrative action, there is little
to recommend an arrangement that deprives a person with the Director's responsibilities of any significant part in the adjudicatory process.
It might be argued that the Director need not be totally excluded
from the adjudicatory process under the present administrative structure. The argument would be that the Appeals Board is free to consult
the Director during the process of exercising its adjudicatory authority,
although nothing in OFDI's regulations suggests that such consultation
is contemplated. Even assuming that such an optional consultative
role for the Director is better than no role at all, the argument is
subject to certain limitations. By the terms of section 5(c), the
Appeals Board may consult only agency employees who have not been
"engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions"
in the adjudication before it. The Appeals Board's freedom to consult
the Director is thus limited to adjudicatory proceedings in which the
Director has played no investigatory or prosecutory part. This limitation would almost certainly prove disabling because it would permit
the Director a consultative role in the adjudicatory process at the price
of denying him any role at all in the investigatory and prosecutory
processes. An arrangement precluding the Director from exercising
decisive authority over any part of the compliance process is hardly
wise.
The impracticality of the present administrative structure of
OFDI suggests the wisdom of making the Director the agency for
purposes of adjudication. This would necessitate a revision of OFDI's
regulations in order to place appeals in compliance proceedings directly
in the Director. The Director as the agency would have the authority
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-which the APA recognizes as necessary if agencies are to achieve
their substantive goals-to combine investigative, prosecuting, negotiating, and adjudicatory functions, subject only to such limitations as
section 5(c) imposes. The discussion that follows proceeds on the
assumption that the Director has been made the agency for all purposes.
The question is whether separation of functions problems are presented by an administrative structure in which the Director is the
agency. It should be made clear at the outset that the law with
respect to separation of functions is statutory law, based upon the
APA, and not constitutional law. The Supreme Court has held that
a combination of functions that would be impermissible were the APA
applicable does not constitute a denial of due process. 1" Early in the
history of the APA the Court had remarked, in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath,'4 ' that "[i]t might be difficult to justify as measuring up
to constitutional standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of which has been condemned by Congress
as unfair even where less vital matters of property rights are at stake."
But in the subsequent decision of Mrcello v. Bondsy a the Court
rejected an argument that the hearing procedures of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, which was not subject to the APA, denied
due process because the special inquiry officer was subject to the supervision and control of officials charged with investigative and prosecuting functions.143 Professor Davis has concluded that the Court's
remark in Wong Yang Sung "has virtually no support in previous law
and it seems to be superseded by the deportation cases of Marcello
and Accardi." 144
The Supreme Court indicated in Wong Yang Sung that one of
the central purposes behind passage of the APA was "to curtail and
change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties
of prosecutor and judge," 1' and "to ameliorate the evils [resulting]
from the commingling of functions." 146 Section 5 (c) represents
Congress' attempt to achieve those goals. But it is important to remember, as the Court noted in Wong Yang Sung, that "[t]he Administrative Procedure Act did not go so far as to require a complete
separation of investigating and prosecuting functions from adjudicating
functions." ' 4' Section 5 concludes its prohibition against certain
14o See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
141339 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1950).

142349 U.S. 302 (1955).
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1442 K. DAVIs, supra note 35, at § 13.02, at 178.
145 339 U.S. at 41.

146 Id.at 46.
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forms of combination of functions by providing that it "does not apply
(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency." "' By this exception Congress recognized that
those who bear ultimate responsibility for the administration of a substantive program must necessarily be involved in all phases of its
implementation.
Because section 5 (c) does not apply to the agency, the Director
is not prohibited from combining functions. He is entitled to participate in every phase of OFDI's administrative procedures-such as
investigating, prosecuting, negotiating settlements, and adjudicatingwithout challenge under section 5 (c), "[n] o matter how flagrant may
be the combination of inconsistent functions." 149 The clarity of the
statutory language may explain the absence of even a single case
raising a question about its meaning. (Of course, the nature of the
Director's participation in the investigatory or prosecutory stages of
a proceeding may compromise his capacity to serve as an impartial
adjudicator-an issue to be discussed in terms of bias rather than of
separation of functions.)
One provision of section 5 (c), however, does apply to the administrative procedures of OFDI and requires an internal separation of
functions:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may
not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise
in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of 50this title, except as witness or counsel
in public proceedings.1
Before considering the implications of this provision, two observations
may be appropriate.
First, this provision applies only to proceedings governed by
section 5 of the APA. The application of section 5 is limited to
"case[s] of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 1' This means that
the prohibitions of this provision apply to compliance proceedings since,
as Part III of this article concluded, they are governed by section 5.
Second, this provision very closely parallels section 1050.108 of
OFDI's regulations:
(a) In a formal administrative proceeding, no person
not employed by the Office and no employee or agent of the
U.S.C. § 554(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 13.06, at 214.
150
5
U.S.C.
§ 554(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
151 1d. § 554(a).
148 5
1402
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Office who performs any investigative or prosecuting function in connection with the proceeding, shall communicate
ex parte, directly or indirectly, with any person involved in
the decisional process in such proceeding, with respect to the
merits of that or a factually related proceeding.
(b) In a formal administrative proceeding, no person
involved in the decisional process of such proceeding shall
communicate ex parte, directly or indirectly, with any person
not employed by the Office, or with any employee or agent
of the Office who performs any investigative or prosecuting
function in connection with the proceedings, with respect
to
1 52
the merits of that or a factually related proceeding.

The reciprocal statement that section 1050.108 gives to the prohibitions laid upon those performing investigative and prosecuting functions and those involved in the decisional process achieves the same
substantive breadth as the provision of section 5(c) under present
consideration. Thus, an analysis that considers the implications of
section 5(c) necessarily states the implications of section 1050.108
as well. The language of section 5(c) makes clear that any OFDI employee who has "engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions . . . in a case" may not "participate or advise in
the [Director's] decision" of the case. This language--designed to
prevent the Director from consulting certain persons in the course of
the performance of his adjudicatory functions-presents a number of
questions.
1. "Investigative or Prosecuting Functions"
Section 5 (c) does not require that the Director be insulated from
the advice of every OFDI employee in the performance of his adjudicatory functions. It requires that he be insulated only from the advice
of those employees who have engaged in the performance of "investigative" or "prosecuting" functions in the case under consideration.
The first question concerns the meaning and reach of "investigative"
and "prosecuting."
Read literally, section 5(c) would prohibit the Director from
consulting at least the director of the compliance division, since he
will typically have been involved in investigating and prosecuting functions in every compliance proceeding, as well as those employees of
the compliance division who have participated in investigating, preparing, or presenting the case against the direct investor. Such ac152 15

C.F.R. § 1050.108 (1970).
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tivity-within the division of OFDI directly responsible for prosecuting individuals-is most obviously within the literal meaning of
"investigative" and "prosecuting" functions.
The difficulty lies in determining when OFDI employees who
are not a part of the compliance division have performed "investigative" or "prosecuting" functions that will disqualify them from
participating or advising in the Director's decision. Three questions
may help to expose the difficulty.
First, does section 5(c) prohibit the Director from asking the
judgment of the chief counsel (or any other OFDI employee) if the
chief counsel has participated in granting an interpretation or determining an application for a specific authorization, particularly if the
meaning or validity of one or the other is at issue? Such participation
by the chief counsel is plausibly part of neither an "investigative" nor
a "prosecuting" function.
Second, does section 5(c) prohibit the Director from asking the
judgment of the chief counsel if the chief counsel advised the director
of the compliance division that this is an appropriate case for prosecution or urged him to bring the prosecution? We have it on the
authority of Professor Davis that "[t]hose who determine that proceedings should be instituted may participate in judging" "'3because
the language of the Act speaks only of "prosecuting" and "says nothing
about combination of instituting proceedings with judging. Under
the Act the same individual may 'accuse' in the sense of deciding that
proceedings should be instituted, and may also judge. This is true
whether the individual is a head of an agency or a subordinate," 154
because what a person does in "approving the institution of proceedings
is much like what judges do in ruling on demurrers or motions to
dismiss." '

Third, does section 5(c) prohibit the Director from asking the
judgment of the chief counsel if the chief counsel has taken part in
unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a settlement? Because the language
speaks only of "investigative" and "prosecuting" functions, Professor
Davis concludes, "[t]he same individual may attempt to negotiate a
settlement and later serve as judge." "'
However plausible these conclusions may seem in terms of a
literal reading of "investigative" and "prosecuting," they are not wholly
satisfying in terms of the purpose of section 5 (c). The premise underlying section 5 (c) is that the integrity of the adjudicatory process will
1532 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 13.06, at 215.
154

Id. § 13.10, at 237.

155 Id.§ 13.11, at 249.
6

15 Id. § 13.06, at 215.

42

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.llg:l

best be protected by excluding participation by agency employees the
nature of whose participation in prior stages of a case suggests that
their contribution might not be sufficiently disinterested. The adjudicator should be insulated from one who has performed investigative
functions because "an investigator's functions may in part be that of
a detective, whose purpose is to ferret out and establish a case. Of
course, this may produce a state of mind incompatible with the objective impartiality which must be brought to bear in the process of
deciding." ' The adjudicator should be insulated from one who has
performed prosecuting functions because "[a] man who has buried
himself in one side of an issue is disabled from bringing to its decision
that dispassionate judgment which Anglo-American tradition demands
of officials who decide questions." 158
Section 5 (c) thus represents the language chosen by Congress to
insure that the adjudicatory process is not contaminated by the participation of those whose state of mind may be that of the advocate
rather than the impartial judge. Once this premise is accepted, it
becomes clear that a literal reading of "investigative" and "prosecuting" is inadequate to serve the purposes underlying section 5(c).
Such a reading will permit some employees with an advocate's state
of mind to participate in adjudicatory functions and will exclude
others from participating even though their state of mind is unlikely
to be that of an advocate.
For example, it is fairly clear upon a literal reading of section
5 (c) that the chief counsel may participate and advise in the Director's
decision of a compliance proceeding directly challenging the validity
of an interpretation that the chief counsel issued, although one might
think that the chief counsel's natural commitment to sustaining the
interpretation would make his cast of mind that of an advocate. Similarly, it is fairly clear upon a literal reading of section 5(c) that the
chief counsel may participate and advise in the Director's decision of
a compliance proceeding after having attempted to negotiate a settlement that failed when the direct investor would not accept terms that
the chief counsel regarded as absolute minima in light of the direct
investor's conduct and after having urged that a prosecution be brought,
although here too one might think that the chief counsel would hold
an advocate's "sincere belief in the justice of his cause." 159
Yet the chief counsel may be barred by a literal reading of section
5 (c) from participating and advising in the Director's decision in a
157 ATTORNEY GENERAI'S FINAL REPORT,

supra note 43, at 56.
H 205 (1962).

158 Id.; see A. BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRA

15 92 K. DAVIS, supra note 35, at § 13.07, at 218.
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compliance case under circumstances in which it is quite unlikely that
his prior participation has given him an advocate's cast of mind. For
example, it might be argued that the chief counsel had engaged in
an "investigative" function by advising the director of the compliance
division on the appropriate reach and limits of the subpoena power
and on the necessary language that a particular subpoena must contain
to be valid, although one might think that the chief counsel would
make such routine judgments without especially noticing the merits
of the case involved.
Paradoxes of these kinds suggest the necessity of working out
a solution that takes account of the literal meaning of the language
as well as the underlying premises of section 5(c). The task is
difficult because of the dearth of relevant legislative history and of
cases on point. 0 0 Moreover, resolution of the appropriate adjudicatory
role of agency employees involves subtleties of human motivation and
behavior that are difficult to assess in particular cases and unamenable
to generalization beyond them.
Professor Davis-whose views are likely to be relied upon by
courts because of the paucity of decided cases-has suggested that
"[f] rom the standpoint of accomplishing the basic purpose [of section
5(c)] without undue harm to other interests, the need may be for
giving a narrow interpretation to the term 'investigative' and a broad
interpretation to the term 'prosecuting'." ' At a later point Professor
Davis argues that "[i]f the agencies follow the broad intent as distinguished from the literal words, they will interpret the term 'prosecuting' to cover all advocating, whether or not any accusation is made.
Whatever the Act provides or fails to provide, reviewing courts should
not allow an advocate to participate in judging." 162 It should be
recognized, however, that courts are more likely to accept Professor
Davis' contention that a narrow reading be given to "investigative"
with respect to a claims agency, such as the Railroad Retirement
Board, than to a prosecuting agency, such as OFDI. Perhaps one
can be no more precise than to suggest that an agency must insure
that the adjudicatory process is not seriously contaminated by the
participation of employees whose prior association with a case raises
the possibility that their contribution will be shaped by an advocate's
state of mind.
1 60

See S.

No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1945); H.R. REP. No.
"The courts have strangely refrained from
their usual leadership in working out minimal standards of fairness." 2 K. DAvis,
supra note 35, at § 13.01, at 172.
1612 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 13.07, at 216.
16 2 Id. § 13.11, at 249; see id. § 13.10, at 235-36.
REP.

1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1946).
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2. Investigators and Prosecutors as Supervisors and Subordinates
As the discussion to this point has indicated, section 5 (c) excludes
from participation in the adjudicatory process agency employees who
have "engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions" in the case under decision. The language does not explicitly exclude the participation of agency employees whose prior
activity does not fairly constitute "the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions."
Thus it might be thought that, in the course of performing his
adjudicatory functions, the Director could appropriately seek the advice
of (1) agency employees who are the subordinates of investigators and
prosecutors, so long as they have not themselves performed investigative or prosecuting functions in the case under decision, and (2)
agency employees who supervise investigators and prosecutors, again
so long as they have not themselves performed investigative or prosecuting functions in the case under decision.
This would mean, for example, that the Director would be permitted to consult employees of the chief counsel's office and of the
compliance division on occasions when section 5(c) would prohibit
consultation with the chief counsel and the director of the compliance
division. It would also mean that the Director would be permitted
to consult the chief counsel or the director of the compliance division
on occasions when section 5 (c) would prohibit consultation with their
subordinates.
Although a reading of section 5 (c) permitting such results would
appear plausible in terms of its language alone, it is not clear that
such a reading is correct. Thus, Professor Davis, after quoting the
statutory language, writes:
Questions of interpretation of this language are legion. Is
a general counsel who supervises investigators or prosecutors
disqualified from advising the agency on a question of law?
Is such a general counsel disqualified from supervising other
attorneys who give such advice? May a general counsel
supervise both a section of reviewers and a section of investigators and prosecutors? Does the Act's express provision
that presiding officers may not be supervised by an officer
engaged in prosecuting or investigating mean, through application of the expressio unius principle, that other staff members participating in judging may be so supervised? Questions of this type probably can reasonably be answered either
way, and the decision may well depend largely on special
circumstances in particular agencies. The major purpose is
to prevent contamination of judging with either investigating
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or prosecuting. Even a small contamination may defeat that
purpose.'6
Professor Davis' statement implies that there may be prohibitions
beyond those stated in the language of section 5 (c) upon the persons
whom the Director may consult in the course of adjudication, and
that these prohibitions, if they exist, would rest upon the purposes
underlying the APA's proscription of combination of functions. Unless
the implication of this statement is taken seriously, it is possible to
read section 5(c) to permit some results that seem questionable in
light of the premises underlying the APA.
The separation of functions provisions of the APA are based on
the premise that the impartiality of the adjudicatory process will be
protected significantly by excluding the participation of those whose
contribution is not likely to be sufficiently disinterested. The purpose
of section 5 (c)-put with only something of an oversimplificationis to prevent the advocate from advising the judge and thereby to
preclude a biased input in the adjudicatory process.
The first question, then, is whether agency employees who are
the subordinates of investigators or prosecutors may advise and participate in the Director's performance of his adjudicatory functions.
Many subordinates-when asked their advice at the adjudicatory stage
of a proceeding in which their supervisor played an investigative or
prosecuting role that has disqualified him from advising the adjudicator-will at least be inclined to support their superior's position.
Subordinates understand the wisdom of justifying the public commitments made by their superiors. To permit a subordinate of the chief
counsel to advise the Director in an adjudication in which the chief
counsel himself is precluded from doing so because he performed investigative or prosecuting functions is to risk that the subordinate's
contribution will be other than dispassionate-precisely a result section
5 (c) was designed to prevent.
In a different provision of section 5 (c) than that under discussion,
Congress recognized the possibilities of personal self-interest inherent
in a supervisor-subordinate relationship. It provided that the employee
presiding at the reception of evidence may not "be responsible to or
subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged
in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency." 16 The use of a section 11 hearing examiner, of course,
satisfies this provision. Yet it is curious that, having perceived the
risk in this context, Congress did not go further and prohibit any
163 Id. § 13.07, at 216.
1645 U.S.C. § 554(d)

(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
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subordinate from participating in an adjudication that almost necessarily will pass upon judgments that his supervisor made as an investigator or prosecutor. Perhaps Congress regarded the risks beyond the
one it provided for insufficiently serious to warrant a legislative prohibition.
The second question is whether agency employees supervising
investigators and prosecutors may advise and participate in the Director's performance of his adjudicatory functions. This question may
be easier than the first. The risk that a supervisor will feel inclined
out of professional self-interest to support a position taken by a
subordinate, while perhaps not improbable, would seem less than the
risk created when the roles are reversed. A supervisor's career (the
chief counsel's, for example) depends most directly upon his superior's
estimate of the quality of his work; he has small incentive in terms of
self-interest to support automatically positions taken by subordinates.
Moreover, section 5(c) contains no provision expressing a concern in
this area comparable to the concern reflected in its provision that a
hearing officer may not be supervised by an investigator or prosecutor.
In short, neither the policy nor the language of section 5(c) would
seem to preclude the Director from seeking the judgment of those who
supervise investigators and prosecutors during the performance of his
adjudicatory functions.
In responding to these two questions it would be helpful if one
could rely upon judicial decisions as a supplement to an abstract
analysis of the premises underlying section 5 (c) and hypotheses about
the ways in which supervisors and subordinates are likely to behave.
Unfortunately, there are not more than a handful of relevant decisions.
They do suggest, however, that courts may be prepared to move
beyond the literal language of section 5(c) in order to effectuate the
spirit of its prohibitions against a combination of functions.
Three decisions involving the Post Office Department are particularly instructive. In Glanzman v. Schaffer,165 an action to enjoin
an order of the Post Office Department, the question was whether
"the administrative proceedings [that had resulted in the order] were
invalid because of .

.

.

lack of proper separation of judicial and

prosecutive functions in the administrative forum." 166 The case was
heard by an examiner whose initial decision was sustained on appeal
by the Solicitor for the Department, to whom, as the court held, the
Postmaster General had validly delegated his adjudicatory functions
pursuant to a specific statutory authorization. The matter was pre165 143 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 252 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1958).
166 Id. at 245.
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sented to the hearing examiner by the Assistant Solicitor of the Department. The court set down the following facts as central to its
consideration:
The affidavit of [the] Assistant Solicitor for the Post
Office Department . . . states that in the handling of these

proceedings no officer or employee who presided at the reception of evidence or who made the initial or final agency
decisions for the Post Office Department is subject to or responsible to, or subject to the supervision or direction of any
officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for the Post Office
Department and that neither [the Assistant Solicitor] nor
any other officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions in this case
participated or advised in the initial decision by the hearing
examiner or the agency decision by . . . the Solicitor for

the Post Office Department." 7

On the basis of the affidavit, the court held, without any discussion,
that "there has been no violation of the principle of separation of
prosecutive and judicial functions in this department. Actually, there
has been a separation of such functions as required by the Administrative Procedure Act .

.

.

..16

The affidavit upon which the decision in Glanzrnan relies made
clear that no employee engaged in the performance of investigative
or prosecuting functions in the case had participated or advised in
the Solicitor's decision except as counsel in public proceedings; such
facts state compliance with section 5 (c). The adjudicator, the Solicitor, was the supervisor of the investigator and prosecutor, the Assistant
Solicitor, but no language in section 5(c) forbids such a relationship.
The fact that the court could sustain the validity of this relationship without discussion-the court of appeals did not discuss the issue
either, because it had been "adequately disposed of in the opinion"
below 169 -suggests

that it could find no issue raised under the literal

language of section 5 (c). It seems unlikely that the court considered
whether an adjudicator, by virtue of his position as supervisor of an
investigator and prosecutor, might have a self-interested inclination,
inconsistent with the impartiality expected of judges, to support the
position taken by his subordinate. Therefore, one should be circumspect in asserting claims about the necessary implications of the court's
decision. The result the court announced, however, appears consistent
6

1 7 Id.
368Id.

at 246-47.
at 246.

169 252 F.2d 333, 334 (2d Cir. 1958).
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with the conclusion suggested above that section 5 (c) does not seem
to preclude participation in the adjudicatory process by supervisors of
investigators and prosecutors.
The second decision involving the Post Office Department, Pinkus
v. Reilly,170 reversed a postal fraud order in part on the ground that
the Department had failed to comply with the requirement in section
3 of the APA that it publish its rules of organization and procedure.
But the decision rests as well on the second ground that the administrative procedures of the Department violated the combination of
functions provisions of the APA.
The court in Pinkus examined the Department's regulations far
more carefully than the court had in Glanzman. It noted that the
regulations in effect when Glanzman was decided "vested [the Solicitor] with prosecuting authority generally, including both the supervision of prosecutions, and, as a matter of procedure, the filing of
complaints," 171 as well as adjudicating authority. "This," the court
said, "indubitably constituted a violation of the above separation of
functions provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, as it was
then, and is now, in effect."

172

By the time that the proceeding in Pinkus arose, the Department
had changed the title of the Solicitor to General Counsel and of the
Assistant Solicitor to Assistant General Counsel. It had also amended
its regulations slightly "to vest in the Assistant General Counsel the
duty to file complaints similar to that here involved against Pinkus." 173
The court found the amendment wanting. "But the violation continued," it said, "since the General Counsel continued to have the
general supervisory power over such prosecutions and over his assistant
. together with the sole adjudicating authority in such cases
, 174

The court then spoke to the argument made successfully by the
Department in Glanzman:
Of course, the Department's claim is immaterial that in
this case in fact the General Counsel did not tell the Assistant
General Counsel what to do in prosecuting Pinkus. For the
purpose of the Act is not only to see that such commingling
of the judicial and prosecuting authority does not occur in
fact in a single case, but to see that it can never occur, and
that the public should know, by publication, that it can never
F. Supp. 548 (D.N.J. 1957).
Id. at 550.
172 Id. at 550-51.
3
17 Id. at 551.
17 Id.
170 157
171
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occur, in order to insure their confidence in the fairness of
their government.1 7 5
What explains the difference in result between Glanzinan and
Pinkus? The court in Glanzinan held that the adjudicator was not
an employee who had engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions, even though he possessed investigative and
prosecuting authority, because an affidavit indicated that he had not
in fact performed such functions in the present case; therefore, read
literally, section 5(c) did not prohibit him from participating and
advising in the decision. The court in Pinkus came to a contrary
conclusion on the same procedural facts because it feared the potential
for commingling of functions that the Post Office Department's administrative structure appeared to permit; it did not seem to feel constrained by the fact that section 5(c) is limited to circumstances in
which the adjudicator has participated in investigative or prosecuting
functions in the present case. The prohibition announced in Pinkus
may be recommended by the purpose of section 5 (c) but it cannot be
found in its language.
It may be suggested that the court's discussion in Pinkus of the
separation of functions issue was at most an alternate holding, which
the court itself qualified by a subsequent passage:
It is a further interesting question whether the Administrative Procedure Act as adopted prevents all such harmful
commingling of the functions of adjudication and prosecution
or only certain harmful commingling, leaving certain commingling of prosecuting and adjudicating authority still lawful. This question is raised now by the parties since, as seen
above, in this case it is not the prosecuting authority which
is alleged to be the superior of the adjudicating authority,
which Wong Yang Sung holds to be prohibited, but rather
it is the adjudicating authority which is alleged to be the
superior of the prosecuting authority. .

.

. [I]t is clear that

in either aspect such commingling may have harmful results,
and so is contrary to the spirit of the Act itself. Now the
Department claims that in fact, according to its plan of
"organization," (unpublished as above) its "General Counsel" is not the superior of this particular "Assistant General
Counsel," when the latter prosecutes fraud cases, despite these
titles, and despite the fact that its General Counsel is the
superior of any or all other Assistant General Counsel in
charge of all the Department's other legal proceedings-a
rather unusual situation. However, assuming this to be correct in fact, it is unnecessary to pursue this point through the
175Id.

at 552.
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lengthy legislative history of the statute, in view of the clear
invalidity of the present procedure [because it was not published] .16
Judge Learned Hand adopted this suggestion in adverting to Pinkus
"7
the third
in his opinion in Columbia Research Corp. v. Schaffer,
and most important of the decisions involving combination of functions
in the Post Office Department.
Columbia Research involved the same procedural facts as Pinkus,
except that the Department had by now published regulations that
sought to describe its internal organization with respect to hearings:
the Assistant General Counsel was the prosecutor and the General
Counsel decided appeals from the hearing examiner's decisions. As
in Glansman and Pinkus, the Department submitted an affidavit asserting that "there has been and there is a complete and actual separation
of investigative and judicial functions * * * and no officer or employee
who presides at the reception of evidence or who makes either initial
or final agency decisions * * * is subject to or responsible to or
subject to [sic] the supervision or direction of any officer, employee
or agent engaged in the performance of prosecuting functions for said
Post Office Department." 178
The terms of the affidavit thus presented again the question
whether section 5(c) permits an employee who hears administrative
appeals, thereby performing an adjudicatory function, to supervise
employees who perform investigative or prosecuting functions. The
court did not decide that question on the merits because it found the
Department's regulations inadequate in their description of the supervisory authority that the General Counsel had over the Assistant
General Counsel. But the court did consider whether the relationship
between the General Counsel and the Assistant General Counsel
could be made consistent with the theory of section 5(c) :
[W]e are not satisfied that it is enough that the Assistant
General Counsel, on whom § 201.4 of the Regulations imposes the duty of preparing complaints, has in fact no part
in the final decision of the General Counsel himself. It would
be plainly contrary to the purpose of the section, if the General Counsel prepared the complaint and the Assistant Counsel made the final decision; for the subordinate would then
be passing upon the success of what his superior had undertaken. True, the reverse, which is the actual situation, does
not present so obvious a fusion of prosecutor and judge;
176 Id.
177 256
17

8

F2d 677 (2d Cir. 1958).

Id. at 679.
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nevertheless, when the subordinate is prosecutor and his
superior is judge, it appears to us reasonable to suppose that
the prosecutor will be disposed to select such cases as he
believes will meet with his superior's approval, and that his
discretion may be exercised otherwise than if each was responsible to the Postmaster only by a separate chain of
authority. It is of course true that under any possible system
of administration in the end there will be the fusion of
prosecutor and judge, subject only to the supervision of the
courts; but it makes much difference whether it be reserved
to the highest level of authority: i.e., to the "agency" itself
and it is fairly obvious that Congress had just this in mind
when at the end of § 1004(c) it provided that the subsection
should not apply to the "agency" or to any of its
"members."
1 79
There alone was the fusion to be permissible.

Having spoken at such length to the merits, the court added a
further comment during the course of reversing the Department's
order because the regulation failed to comply with the APA:
However, if, contrary to what appears to us its very
probable purpose, the section does not forbid the powers of
the prosecutor and the judge to interpenetrate: that is, if the
prosecutor may be subject to the judge in some specifically
declared circumstances, nevertheless, we think that § 1002
(a) (1) and (2) require that any such relation, to be valid
at all, must be spelled out and published as a regulation
180

Finally, the court noted that neither Glanznuan nor Pinkus could
fairly be said to have decided the question whether section 5 (c) permits an adjudicator to supervise an investigator or prosecutor. In
Glanznan the court did not "give any reasons for [its] conclusion"
that "an affidavit like that filed in the case at bar was enough to
comply with the statute" and "neither in the notice of appeal nor in
the briefs on appeal was the question raised or discussed." '81 In
Pinkus the court "reserved the added question, which we have discussed here, whether by a published regulation the 'agency' could
make an investigating or prosecuting officer subordinate to the deciding officer." " Judge Hand concluded by a further reference to
the merits:
As has already appeared we too reserve any final decision
as to that, although it seems to us indeed difficult in the situa179Id.
180 Id.

l8 Id. at 680.
182 Id.
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tion here presented to forecast how a regulation could be
so drafted as to avoid the objection if the Assistant General
Counsel remains a subordinate of the General Counsel."s
Judge Hand's thoughtful analysis of the purposes of section 5 (c)
makes Columbia Research the most important of the three decisions
discussed, even though it does not formally decide the separation of
functions question. Several observations may be relevant.
First, the decision in Columbia Research is consistent with the
conclusion that courts sensitive to the premises underlying the APA's
prohibition against the combination of functions will not regard the
literal language of section 5 (c) as the end of the matter.
The administrative structure created by the Post Office Department was in compliance with section 5 (c) in the sense that no explicit
language prohibited it, but that was insufficient to persuade Judge
Hand that he was estopped from inquiring further. The fact that
Judge Hand found justification for looking beyond the literal language-indeed, for strongly suggesting that the Post Office Department's administrative structure was invalid-almost certainly means
that other courts will, too.
Second, the decision in Columbia Research confirms the suggestion that courts which look beyond the literal language of section 5 (c)
are likely to focus on the psychological tendencies that may be created
by a relationship involving supervisors who adjudicate and subordinates who investigate or prosecute.
Judge Hand was concerned that a prosecutor in such a relationship "will be disposed to select such cases as he believes will meet
with his superior's approval, and that his discretion will be exercised
otherwise" 184 than if he were independent of the adjudicator's supervision. Assuming that a prosecutor supervised by an adjudicator may
be so disposed, Judge Hand does not indicate why this consequence
would conflict with the premises underlying section 5 (c). Prosecutors
generally tend to bring cases they expect an adjudicator to sustain.
Although a concern that forum shopping be minimized-perhaps particularly by a prosecutor-finds expression at some points in our law,
it does not seem to be a concern of section 5 (c). The language Judge
Hand chose to make his point suggests that he read section 5 (c) as
condemning any relationship between the adjudicator and the prosecutor, short of complete separation, that might conceivably appear to
open up the psychological possibility of partiality. (Judge Hand does
not mention the possibility that an adjudicator who supervises a
183 Id.
184 Id. at 679.
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prosecutor may feel a self-interested inclination to support a position
taken by a subordinate.)
Third, the decision in Columbia Research may have limited application to OFDI because it rests upon a factual pattern significantly
different from the pattern likely to exist at OFDI during the course
of adjudication. At the Post Office Department, the General Counsel
who exercised final adjudicatory authority was not the agency for
purposes of the APA. At OFDI, the Director in whom final adjudicatory authority rests will be the agency. The fact that the APA
permits the agency (for example, the Director of OFDI) alone among
administrative employees to adjudicate as well as to supervise prosecutors while denying a combination of functions to all other employees
(for example, the General Counsel of the Post Office Department)
suggests the possibility that Columbia Research does not control the
present facts.
The difference in the factual patterns may be put still another
way. At the Post Office Department, the adjudicator supervised the
prosecutor. At OFDI, the adjudicator may seek the advice of employees such as the Chief Counsel who supervises employees who
have performed investigative or prosecuting functions, but the Chief
Counsel is not the adjudicator and, as it may happen, may not be
consulted by the adjudicator at all. The relationship at OFDI between the adjudicator and employees supervising prosecutors is thus
more attenuated than the same relationship was at the Post Office
Department. Judge Hand's fear that the prosecutor may be disposed
to select cases with knowledge of the adjudicator's predilections seems
unlikely to result at OFDI merely because the Director may ask the
Chief Counsel's advice during the course of adjudications. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the authority to bring
compliance proceedings formally rests with the chief of the compliance
185
division rather than with the Chief Counsel.
Because the Post Office Department responded to judge Hand's
opinion by vesting adjudicatory authority in a Judicial Officer with
no supervisory power over employees who prosecuted, 8 6 and because
other agencies have not created relationships in which adjudicators
have supervised prosecutors, the theory of Columbia Research has not
been put to subsequent judicial testing. The paucity of decided cases
involving separation of functions issues suggests that violations of
section 5(c) either rarely occur or rarely come to light. It was only
18515 C.F.R. §1030.211(c) (1970).
18 6 See United States Bio-Genics Corp. v. Christenberry, 173 F. Supp. 645
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Greene v. Kern, 178 F. Supp. 201 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curian, 269
F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1959).
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because the Post Office Department's published rules seemed to raise
the possibility on their face that inconsistent functions would not be
kept separate that the decisions resulted in Glanzman, Pinkus, and
Columbia Research.
In the absence of published rules obviously presenting such questions on their face, separation of functions issues are unlikely to be
raised, if only because members of the public will not typically have
an opportunity to learn the identity of agency employees whom agency
members may have consulted during the course of any particular
adjudication.
This cannot be the end of the matter, however, for an agency
conscientiously interested in complying with section 5(c) no matter
how small the chances that a violation may be discovered. Some
concluding observations may therefore be appropriate.
Despite the evident ambiguities of section 5 (c), the Director
ought not consult the chief of the compliance division or any of his
subordinates during the course of performing his adjudicatory functions. The chief of the compliance division almost certainly will
have performed "investigative or prosecuting functions" in every
compliance proceeding reaching the Director for decision. Although
subordinates of the chief of the compliance division may not have
actually performed "investigative or prosecuting functions" in particular cases, the likelihood that they will be motivated by a selfinterested inclination to support the position their superior has taken
brings them within the interdiction of Columbia Research. Moreover,
the fact that OFDI is a relatively small administrative agency probably increases the likelihood that a court would be concerned over
participation by members of the compliance division, even if literal
compliance with section 5(c) might plausibly be argued.
Conversely, the Director may consult members of the authorizations and policy divisions during the course of performing his adjudicatory functions. Neither of these divisions performs "investigative
or prosecuting functions." Routine consultation between these divisions and the compliance division-for example, as to the intended
meaning or proper construction of the language used in a particular
specific authorization--does not implicate them in the performance of
"investigative or prosecuting functions" and will not disable the
Director from consulting them if he so chooses.
The question whether the Director may consult the Chief Counsel
during the course of performing his adjudicatory functions cannot be
answered categorically. The answer will depend upon a case-by-case
analysis of whether the Chief Counsel's prior participation in the pro-
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ceeding-most likely as a consultant to the compliance division-was
sufficiently intensive to make his cast of mind that of an advocate.
Routine consultation with the compliance division, particularly upon
questions of law or agency policy, ought not be regarded as barring
the Director from seeking the judgment of the Chief Counsel during
the decisionmaking process. Prudence cautions, however, against permitting the compliance division to consult the Chief Counsel about
the merits of particular compliance proceedings unless the Director is
willing to risk being disabled from consulting the Chief Counsel during
the performance of his adjudicatory functions.
The risk does not seem worth running. It is plainly to the
Director's advantage to be able to receive legal advice from the man
who is the agency's chief legal officer and who may be required to
support the Director's decision in court. The chief of the compliance
division may, of course, also need access to expert legal advice, but
he has lawyers on his own staff to whom he may turn. If the Chief
Counsel is held to have engaged in "investigative or prosecuting
functions," he cannot present his views to the Director. The chief
of the compliance division, on the other hand, can always present
his views to the Director "as witness or counsel in the public proceedings, including the filing of briefs." " Thus it seems wiser to
insure that the Director, rather than the chief of the compliance division, be free to consult with the Chief Counsel when the choice is
mutually exclusive.
Even assuming that the Chief Counsel will be able to stay clear
of "investigative and prosecuting functions" and will therefore remain
available for consultation by the Director during the course of adjudicatory proceedings, it is obvious that the Director will need assistance
from a lawyer in the preparation of his written decision. The process
of reading an administrative record, considering the arguments and
exceptions put forward in the briefs, and preparing an opinion responsive to the record and the briefs, is a time-consuming job. The
Director, even when he happens to be a lawyer, cannot fairly be
expected to do it alone. Although the Chief Counsel's office conceivably could perform the opinion-writing function, it would be
wiser to place it in a full-time legal assistant to the Director. Almost
every important federal administrative agency (for example, the
Federal Communications Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission) has a separate opinion-writing staff, responsible only to the
members of the agency and charged with no other responsibilities for
achievement of the agency's substantive goals. This arrangement
18 7

ATToRNEY GNEnAi's MANUAL,

supra note 31, at 57.
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insures the appearance of fairness and obviates the possibility that
the Chief Counsel will be required or permitted to play a significant
role in passing judgment upon the work of the chief of the compliance
division, his nominal equivalent in OFDI's organizational structure.
B. Disqualificationfor Bias
Congress made the judgment in enacting section 5(c) that the
agency should be permitted to perform both adjudicatory and investigative and prosecuting functions. But the legislative history indicates
that Congress understood that the combination of functions authorized
by section 5 (c) created the possibility of bias. There is also evidence
that Congress intended therefore that the combination of functions be
permitted only to the extent necessary.188
In section 7(a) of the APA, Congress made available a procedure
by which claims of bias could be passed upon by administrative
agencies: 1s9

On the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit
of personal bias or other disqualification of a presiding or
participating employee, the agency shall determine the matter
as a part of the record and decision in the case. 9 °
Beyond the terms of section 7(a), courts have indicated that a
combination of functions that creates the possibility of bias in administrative adjudication gives rise to serious questions of due process.
A number of significant cases make clear that an agency decision
rendered in compliance with the APA's strictures on separation of
functions may nevertheless be set aside as a denial of due process
because the adjudicator was biased. Much of the law in this area
builds upon recent Supreme Court decisions involving judicial bias. 9 '
Questions of bias will focus primarily upon the Director since
he will exercise final adjudicatory authority at OFDI. The possibility
that the Director may bring judgments about law or policy-as opposed to judgments about facts-to the adjudication of compliance
proceedings is not a serious concern. "Bias in the sense of crystallized
point of view about issues of law or policy is almost universally deemed
188 See S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 1980,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1946) ; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 43,
at 57; Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1959); text
accompanying
notes 47-52 supra.
189 See Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Long Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
295 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1961); National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 927 (1956).
190 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
191 Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957) ; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133
(1955) ; Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
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no ground for disqualification." 192 Indeed, one of the obligations of
those who serve as members of an agency is to develop coherent
1 93
philosophies as to regulatory policy.
In addition, two kinds of bias that have been condemned by
courts may be set aside as irrelevant to the present inquiry because
they will not result from any particular administrative structure
created for the process of adjudication. The first is bias resulting
from an adjudicator's personal, usually pecuniary, interest in the outcome of a proceeding. 94 Cases involving bias of this kind in federal
administrative agencies have been rare.'9 5 The second is bias resulting
from an adjudicator's personal prejudice, hostility, or favoritism
toward a party to a proceeding."9e Cases involving bias of this kind
typically have seen an adjudicator create the appearance that impartial
adjudication could not be had by publicly announcing his conclusion,
before an administrative proceeding was held, that a person was guilty
197
of agency charges pending against him.
Although it is not impossible that bias in either of these two
senses might result at OFDI, it would not be the consequence of the
selection of any particular administrative structure for the adjudication
of compliance proceedings.
OFDI's administrative structure does present a bias question,
however, that requires serious analysis. It is obvious that the Director
will have gained some knowledge of the facts (and may also have
formed some judgments as to the policy issues) in most compliance
proceedings before he is required to perform his adjudicatory functions. The Director's knowledge of the facts will derive from his
participation in prior stages of the proceedings. The Director may
gain such knowledge, for example, when he approves the decision to
initiate an investigation or issue a complaint against a direct investor
on the basis of a presentation made by the compliance division. He
may gain such knowledge when he approves the terms upon which
192 2 K. DAvis, spra note 35, at § 12.01, at 131; see United States v. Morgan,
313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).

193 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
194 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Cf. Air Transport Ass'n v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967).
cert. denied, 316 U.S.
677 (1942), and Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913), with NLRB v. Pittsburgh
'95

106 Compare Price v. Johnston, 125 F2d 806 (9th Cir.),

S.S. Co.,
337 U.S. 656 (1949).
97

'
See Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) ; Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated & remanded
ot other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965) ; cf. American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d
757 (6th Cir. 1966) ; Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Bufalino
v. Kennedy, 322 F2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC. 267 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959) ; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347

U.S. 260 (1954).

58

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.l19:1

OFDI would be prepared to accept a consent settlement as the result
of prehearing negotiation with the direct investor. He may gain such
knowledge when he determines a direct investor's application for a
specific authorization.
Although it is true that "a fair hearing presupposes an impartial
trier of fact and that prior official involvement in a case renders impartiality most difficult to maintain," 198 the cases make clear that
some forms of prior official involvement in a case will not disqualify
an adjudicator for bias. The leading Supreme Court decision is
NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co.'99 The question was whether a
hearing examiner who had rejected the proffer of certain evidence
as valueless should have been disqualified as biased from hearing the
case on remand after a court of appeals had held that exclusion of
the evidence had resulted in denial of a fair hearing. Although it
could be argued that the examiner had prejudged the value of the
proffered evidence-the argument might seem strengthened by the
fact that at the second hearing the examiner heard the previously
excluded evidence and then made the same findings as he had at the
first hearing-the Supreme Court held that he was not disqualified:
The Court [of Appeals, in finding the hearing examiner disqualified by bias,] seemed to be moved by the generous feeling
that a party ought not be put to trial before an examiner who,
by reason of his prior rulings and findings, may not be
capable of exercising impartiality. Certainly it is not the
rule of judicial administration that, statutory requirements
apart .

.

. a judge is disqualified from sitting in a retrial

because he was reversed on earlier rulings. We find no
warrant for imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer
rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because
they ruled strongly against a party in the first hearing."'
The decision thus seems to stand for the proposition that an adjudicator will not automatically be held disqualified merely because he
has prejudged certain issues of fact-that is, "previously announced
a position concerning an appraisal of particular facts" °--which he
is subsequently called upon to decide during the course of an adjudication.
The conclusion that "a hearing examiner is not biased, either in
law or in fact, simply because he previously ruled against one of the
198 Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967).
199 330 U.S. 219 (1947).

200 Id.at 236-37.
2012 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 12.01, at 139.
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parties" "0is reflected in a consistent line of cases.2 0 3 For example,
in MacKay v. McAlexander2 °4 the court held that a hearing officer
who presided at a deportation hearing in which he issued an order
that must be read as rejecting appellant's central factual claim was
not disqualified from presiding at a subsequent hearing on appellant's
application for a suspension of deportation. The court stated:
The unfavorable opinion of a party or witness which a
hearing officer or a trial judge may entertain as a result of
evidence received in a prior and connected hearing involving
that individual is not "bias" in the invidious sense. It is
in effect a judicially-determined finding which may properly
influence such officer or judge in a supplemental proceeding
involving the penalty or punishment to be assessed, or the
grace to be extended. No unfairness or lack of due process
was inherent in the fact that the same hearing officer presided
in both proceedings." 5
Because of the factual context in which MacKay arose, it seems
a fair conclusion that the application of Donnelly Garment is not
limited to circumstances involving remand of an administrative proceeding to an adjudicator; it extends as well to successive proceedings
on related matters involving the same adjudicator. It also seems a
fair conclusion that the principle of Donnelly Garment applies to
adjudicators who are members of an agency with at least as much
force as it does to hearing examiners; indeed, because of the premises
underlying section 5(c), it may apply to members of an agency with
greater force.
These two conclusions are supported by the decision in Pangburn
v. CAB,2 °0 which involved two successive administrative determinations by members of the CAB. In the first proceeding, the Board
determined that the probable cause of an accident involving a plane
piloted by Pangburn was pilot error; the Board issued its accident
report as part of its statutory duty to investigate airplane crashes and
make public reports as to their circumstances and probable cause.
Shortly thereafter, in the second proceeding, the Board issued an
order suspending Pangburn's pilot license for ninety days; the record
202 Converse v. Udall, 262 F. Supp. 583, 590 (D. Ore. 1966), aff'd, 399 F.2d 616
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969).
203 Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub nora.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 35, at § 12.06, at
169; Note, Disqualification of Administrative Officials for Bias, 13 VAND. L. REV.
712 (1960).
204268 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960).
205 Id. at 39.
206311 F2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962).
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upon which this order was based did not include the accident report
from the first proceeding.
The court rejected Pangburn's contention that the Board should
be disqualified by bias from deciding the second proceeding because
of the "concrete and specific factual determination" 207 it had made
in the first. "It is well settled," the court said, "that a combination
of investigative and judicial functions within an agency does not
violate due process." "o The court noted that the strictures in section
5(c) with respect to combination of functions do not apply to the
agency and that Donnelly Garment had found no violation of due
process when an adjudicator presided at a second hearing after having
formed judgments of fact at a first. The court also noted that the
Supreme Court had sustained the right of judges to try contempt
proceedings that they had initiated, even when the contempt was
personal to themselves. °9 The court concluded that "we cannot say
that the mere fact that a tribunal has had contact with a particular
factual complex in a prior hearing, or indeed has taken a public
position on the facts, is enough to place that tribunal under a constitutional inhibition to pass upon the facts in a subsequent hearing.
We believe that more is required." 210
The decision in Pangburn is not beyond criticism. Because "the
CAB had made a public commitment to a finding of pilot error" in
the first proceeding, it is not unlikely that "CAB members had a
strong incentive [in the second proceeding] to avoid appearing publicly
to be inconsistent." 21 It is fair to respond to such criticism by
pointing out that the decision in Pangburn is supported by the existing
case law. In addition, if all the members of the Board had been
disqualified the case could not have been decided at all. But the
response is incomplete because the thrust of the criticism is that in
some circumstances not presently reached by the case law an adjudicator should be disqualified because he has prejudged certain issues
of fact.

The decision in Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC" 2 may suggest

that courts will look beyond existing case law in determining when
to limit participation by an adjudicator who has formed judgments
in prior proceedings about factual issues presented by the proceedings
currently before him.
2

071d. at 356.

2 8

0 1d.

2

091d. at 357 (citing Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957); Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952)).

210311

F.2d at 358.

supra note 35, at § 13.02, at 32 (Supp. 1965).
F2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

2112 K. DAvis,
212306
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The court in Amos Treat held that Commissioner Cohen was
disqualified by bias, under principles of due process, from participating
in an adjudicatory proceeding. Before becoming a member of the
SEC, Cohen had served as director of the Commission's Division of
Corporate Finance. In that capacity he had ordered an informal
investigation of a company that had filed a registration statement.
He reported the results of that investigation to the full Commission,
which ordered the institution of a formal examination and investigation. Within a month after Cohen became a Commissioner, the SEC
acted upon the recommendation of the Division of Corporate Finance
and instituted administrative proceedings to suspend the effectiveness
of the company's registration statement. Relying solely on due
process grounds, the court held:
We are unable to accept the view that a member of an
investigative or prosecuting staff may initiate an investigation, weigh its results, perhaps then recommend the filing of
charges, and thereafter become a member of that commission
or agency, participate in adjudicatory proceedings, join in
commission or agency rulings and ultimately pass upon the
possible amenability of the respondents to the administrative
orders of the commission or agency. So to hold, in our
view, would be tantamount to that denial of administrative
due process against which both the Congress and the courts
have inveighed.2 13
The facts in Amos Treat presented a circumstance in which a
member of an agency changed his function completely during the
course of an adjudicatory proceeding. Commissioner Cohen began
the proceeding entirely as a prosecutor; by its conclusion, he had become entirely an adjudicator. The case thus presented a question of
a succession-not a combination-of functions.
There is no reason to believe that the provision of section 5(c)
exempting members of the agency from the proscription against
combining functions was intended to apply to such a situation. First,
the facts do not present the necessity for a combination of functions
that Congress concluded existed at the agency level alone; in this
respect, the case is distinguishable from Pangburn. Second, the facts
are inconsistent with the hypothesis, implicit in section 5 (c), that an
adjudicator who is a member of an agency may be expected to exercise
his prosecuting function with a self-restraint unnecessary and inappropiate in a person (such as the director of the SEC's Division of
Corporate Finance) whose function is to make the case as strong as
213

Id. at 266-67.
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possible, not to preserve a cast of mind capable of subsequently rendering impartial judgment.
It seems clear, then, that the decision in Amos Treat could
properly have been rested upon the court's conclusion that section
5 (c) "applied to Commissioner Cohen as director of the Division of
Corporate Finance. Its prohibitory impact followed him and attended
when he became a member of the Commission." 214 Even when the
decision in Amos Treat is accepted as resting upon constitutional
grounds, the result is still dependent upon the fact that the case presented a question of a succession, rather than a combination, of
functions.
The principal authority upon which the court relied, Trans World
Airlines v. CAB,215 closely resembled the facts before the court. The
Solicitor of the Post Office Department signed a brief to the Board
on behalf of the Postmaster General before becoming a member of
the Board and casting the deciding vote in favor of the Postmaster
General. The court vacated the Board's order:
It is plain that in this statute Congress contemplated an
adjudicatory proceeding and conferred upon the Board in this
respect quasi-judicial functions. The fundamental requirements of fairness in the performance of such functions require
at least that one who participates in a case on behalf of any
party, whether actively or merely formally by being on
pleadings or brief, take no part in the decision of that case by
any tribunal on which he may thereafter sit.216
A similar result was reached in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC,217
in which Chairman Dixon was held disqualified by bias from participating in the adjudication of a proceeding involving the same
companies and the same facts that had been investigated by a Senate
subcommittee of which he had been chief counsel. Chairman Dixonlike Commissioner Cohen in Amos Treat and the former Solicitor of
the Post Office Department in Trans World Airlines-had engaged
in a succession, rather than a combination, of functions.2 1,

This conclusion-that Amos Treat is relevant primarily to circumstances involving a succession of functions-is supported by the
court's explanation of the inapplicability of the provision of section
5(c) excluding the agency from the proscription against the combination of functions:
214

d. at 266.

215 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
21
6 Id. at 91.
217 363 F2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
218
See also Camero v. United States, 375 F.2d 777 (Ct. C1. 1967).
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It is our view that the exclusionary sentence relied upon
was intended to permit one who is a Commissioner to participate in a decision of the Commission that an investigation
go forward and even that charges be filed to the end that an
adjudicatory proceeding might be initiated. In such circumstances, it was the purpose of Congress as we construe the
section, to permit a Commissioner to participate in the
ultimate decisional process, and not otherwise.219
The court thus makes clear that it did not intend to disturb on
constitutional grounds of bias the combination of functions that section
5(c) permits to members of the agency. The decision has been
described by one court of appeals as "the exceptional case" 10 and
has been considerably limited by another." 1 Nevertheless, Amos Treat
may have implications beyond questions presenting a succession of
functions because of the court's willingness to invoke the due process
clause to disqualify an agency member when less ultimate means were
at hand.
Of what relevance are the principles just discussed to the Director
of OFDI? Section 5(c) of the APA permits him to commingle
functions because of his status as the agency. Disqualification for
bias is a narrow exception to the unusual grant of authority contained
in section 5 (c). No judicial decision has yet held a member of an
agency disqualified by bias when the process of adjudication has been
carried out in a regularized setting which complied with the separation
of functions requirements of the APA.
This means that in the generality of cases the Director of OFDI
may perform routine supervisory functions in the investigative and
prosecuting stages of a compliance proceeding to the same degree as
do members of other federal administrative agencies-such as the
Federal Trade Commission or the Securities Exchange Commissionwithout running the risk of disqualification for bias. It also means
that the Director may become acquainted with the facts in a compliance proceeding during the course of exercising his preadjudicatory
responsibilities-indeed, he may even make judgments as to factual
issues which are later presented to him for adjudicatory determination
-without risking disqualification for bias.
Thus, allegations of bias will probably fail so long as the Director's exposure to the merits of compliance cases is not greater than
306 F.2d at 266.
SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 323 F2d 284, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 943 (1964).
221 R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966); see Law, Dis219
220

qualification of SEC Commissioners Appointed From the Staff: Amos Treat,
Holman, and the Threat to Expertise, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 257 (1964).
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is necessary to enable him to meet his larger responsibilities of supervising OFDI's operations and personnel, setting the agenda of cases
appropriate for investigation, prosecution, and settlement, and protecting direct investors from the excessive zeal or disproportionate
severity of staff members. This means that the Director ought not
"bury himself in one side of an issue" ' or take a greater interest in
the progress of a particular case than his basic duties require; he
ought not, in short, develop a psychological stance or commitment
inconsistent with the reality or the appearance of impartial adjudication, however appropriate it might be in a member of the compliance
division.
As far as the decision in Amos Treat is concerned, the Director
would be disqualified from adjudicating a compliance proceeding only
if he had participated in the investigatory or prosecuting stages of a
case in an agency capacity, most obviously in the compliance division,
other than as Director. Amos Treat will not govern when the Director
has not previously been employed by the agency.
The importance of circumspection by the Director with respect
to bias is emphasized by the disabling limitations of the two most
obvious alternatives available in the event that the Director is disqualified in a particular case.
The first alternative would be the designation of another employee
of OFDI as the adjudicator for cases in which the Director has
voluntarily disqualified himself or has been held disqualified by a
court. The most appropriate employee would probably be the Deputy
Director because, more than any other senior official of OFDI, he
would tend to bring an officewide perspective to the decision of
adjudicatory proceedings.
The limitations of this alternative are similar to those Judge
Hand spoke to in Columbia Research. The Deputy Director (or any
other OFDI employee designated to substitute for the Director) will
be asked to decide a case in which his immediate superior has been
disqualified because of bias, a circumstance that in some instances
may give rise to an impression in the mind of the Deputy Director
Columbia
as to whom the Director would prefer to see prevail."
Research was precisely concerned with the fairness of an administrative structure in which an adjudicator may be constrained by professional self-interest to make decisions that will please his biased
.pra note 43, at 56.
This conclusion will not be applicable when the Director disqualifies himself
for reasons that do not involve bias but instead reflect a conscientious desire to
maintain an appearance of absolute fairness even in the absence of any suggestion
of bias.
222 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FINAL REPORT,
223
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superior. Although it is not impossible to seek to distinguish Columbia
Research, the central fact remains that the designation of the Deputy
Director will mean that a biased superior is supervising an adjudicator.'
The second alternative is invocation of the so-called doctrine of
necessity, which provides that "[w]here the only tribunal empowered
to act in a controversy is allegedly biased the tribunal has jurisdiction
since the alternative is nonenforcement of the law." 2 The roots of
the doctrine of necessity in this country reach back at least as far as
Chancellor Kent."2 0 In a famous case testing the constitutionality of
taxing the income of federal judges, the Supreme Court made an
important statement of the doctrine: "Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question, thus broadly stated,
we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us . . . . The plaintiff
was entitled by law to invoke our decision . . . and there was no

other appellate tribunal to which under the law he could go ....
In this situation, the only course open to us is to consider and decide
the cause,-a conclusion supported by precedents reaching back many
years." 2-7

Cases presenting the question of the appropriate invocation of
the doctrine of necessity do not frequently reach the Supreme Court.
The most recent decision of significance is FTC v. Cement Institute.am
The issue was whether the entire membership of the Federal Trade
Commission should be disqualified for bias. The court of appeals
had rejected such a contention on the ground that since the FTC was
"the only tribunal clothed with the power and charged with the responsibility of protecting the public against unfair methods of competition
and price discrimination," the doctrine of necessity required that it be
permitted to hear the case.'
Although the Supreme Court found that the members of the FTC
were not in fact biased, it did affirm the appropriateness of invoking
the doctrine:
224 It may well be, of course, that the designation of the Deputy Director, or any
other senior OFDI employee, is impracticable because he will have been involved in
most proceedings to at least as great a degree as the Director.
225 L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADmINISTRATivE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
997 (3d ed. 1968).
22

6 See In re Leffe, 2 Barb. 39 (N.Y. 1846).

Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1920). See also Loughran v. FTC,
143 F2d 431 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Brindey v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936).
228333 U.S. 683 (1948).
227

229

Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 147 F2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1945).
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Moreover, Marquette's position, if sustained, would to a
large extent defeat the congressional purposes which promoted passage of the Trade Commission Act. Had the
entire membership of the Commission been disqualified in
the proceedings against these respondents, this complaint
could not have been acted upon by the Commission or by any
other government agency. Congress has provided for no
such contingency. It has not directed that the Commission
disqualify itself under any circumstances, has not provided
for substitute commissioners should any of its members disqualify, and has not authorized any other government agency
to hold hearings, make findings, and issue cease and desist
orders in proceedings against unfair trade practices. Yet if
Marquette is right, the Commission . . . [by its alleged
bias] completely immunized the practices investigated, even
though they are "unfair," from any cease and desist 2order
by
30
the Commission or any other governmental agency.
Although the broad outlines of the doctrine of necessity would
seem applicable to OFDI, a court would probably not permit the
Director to invoke it in the generality of cases. Courts can be expected to be sensitive to the fact that the "easy and seemingly automatic application of the rule of necessity is more dangerous than is
[typically] recognized . . . for grave injustice may result from allow-

ing disqualified officers to adjudicate cases." "' Because of this fact,
the doctrine of necessity is subject to two important conditions which
indicate that OFDI ought not rely on the possibility that the Director
can invoke the doctrine.
First, courts will not permit an agency to invoke the doctrine
when the agency has failed, in designing its administrative structure,
to provide for an impartial tribunal for occasions upon which the
adjudicator is disqualified for bias." 2 OFDI is not in the position
of the FTC in the Cement Institute proceeding; it has the authority
to provide that another employee of the agency shall perform the
Director's adjudicatory functions when the Director is disqualified.
Moreover, a court is unlikely to permit OFDI to invoke the doctrine
of necessity if it appears that OFDI did not attempt to insure that
the Director's participation in early stages of proceedings kept him
free from the possibilities of bias.
Second, courts are likely to review administrative decisions in
which the doctrine of necessity has been invoked with greater intensity
than they would ordinarily exercise, precisely because the acknowledged
220 333 U.S. at 701 (footnote omitted).
23

23 2

2 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 12.04, at 164.
Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1927).
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2 33
presence of bias presents the due process issue with such clarity.

A court exercising such extraordinary scrutiny may well conclude
that there is no overriding necessity to enforce an OFDI order against
any particular direct investor-the adverse consequences to the public
of nonenforcement will probably appear as less severe than in Cement
Istitute-when the decision underlying the order may have been
contaminated by the Director's bias.
VI. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING APPLICATIONS FOR
SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATIONS

OFDI's regulations provide that applications for specific authorizations will be determined by administrative procedures that do
not include a trial-type hearing.'- 4 The question is whether the APA
requires that a trial-type hearing be held.
Sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA apply "in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 235 These requirements will govern
the specific authorizations process only if granting and denying applications for specific authorizations is (1) adjudication, and is either
(2) required by statute, or (3) constitutionally required under the
3
rule of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath."
A. "Case of Adjudication"
Section 2 of the APA defines "license" as "the whole or part of
an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission," " and
"licensing" as "agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial,
revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment,
modification, or conditioning of a license." 23
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a specific authorization
is a license within the meaning of these definitions. OFDI's regulations provide that: "Transactions subject to the prohibitions contained
233

See Hornsby v. Dobard, 291 F2d 483 (5th Cir. 1961); W. GELLHoRN &
C. BYSE, supra note 69, at 947-48. As Professor Davis has commented, "The extraordinary cases which impel courts to resort to the rule of necessity may often deserve
extraordinary scrutiny by the reviewing court." 2 K. DAvIs, supra note 35, at § 12.04,
at 166. This has also been the trend in recent years in state courts. See, e.g., Board
of Educ. v. Shockley, 52 Del. 277, 156 A2d 214 (1959); Borough of Fanwood v.
Rocco, 33 N.J. 404, 165 A2d 183 (1960).

3415 C.F.R. § 1000.801 (1970).
235 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. V, 1970).
236 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
2375 U.S.C. § 551(8) (Supp. V, 1970).

=8Id. § 551(9).
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in this part which are not generally authorized may be effected only
under specific authorization. Persons subject to the requirements of
this part may be exempted from complying with any requirement
thereof only through a specific exemption." '3 In granting an application for a specific authorization, OFDI gives a direct investor permission to do what otherwise is prohibited. Specific authorizations
serve the traditional licensing function of authorizing conduct which
is unlawful if done without a license. They are the functional equivalents of certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Power Commission,
both of which have been held to be licensing.2 40
The alternative possibility that granting and denying applications
for specific authorizations may be rulemaking is inconsistent with the
letter and spirit of the definition of a rule as "an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy," " particularly in light
of the fact that the words "or particular" mean only that "what is
otherwise rulemaking does not become adjudication merely because
it applies only to particular parties or a particular situation." '2
Section 2 goes on to define "order" as "the whole or part of a
final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking but
including licensing," 13 and "adjudication" as "agency process for
the formulation of an order." " Licensing is thus included within
the APA definition of adjudication.
Taken together, this pattern of definitions means that the process
of granting and denying applications for specific authorizations is
licensing and therefore adjudication within the meaning of the APA.
B. "Required by Statute" or Constitution
Adjudicatory hearings which comply with the APA must be held
only when they are "required by statute." The meaning of this provision and its applicability to the basic documents creating OFDI
have been discussed earlier in connection with compliance proceedings."4 The conclusions reached there are equally applicable here.
29

15 C.F.R. § 1000.801(a) (1970).

24OSee Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951), rev'g per curiam
96 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Mo. 1950); FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964);
1 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at §7.01, at 154-55 (Supp. 1965).
2415 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. V, 1970).
242 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 5.02, at 296 (footnote omitted).
2435
2 44

U.S.C. § 551(6) (Supp. V, 1970).

Id. § 551(7).
245See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
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The absence in the Trading with the Enemy Act, Executive Order
11387, and Department Order 184-A of explicit language requiring
a hearing in the determination of applications for specific authorizations means that that process is not an adjudication "required by
statute" within the meaning of section 5 of the APA, unless a hearing
is constitutionally compelled.
The basic criteria governing the determination of when due
process requires a trial-type hearing have been set forth earlier.24 6 It
is clear that under some circumstances these criteria will require a
trial-type hearing in licensing proceedings.
When the issuance of the license turns in significant part upon
the resolution of disputed issues of adjudicative fact, a trial-type
hearing is likely to be required as the vehicle for making that resolution. A trial-type hearing is also likely to be required when the
issuance of the license has substantial public consequences, either
because it involves an area of significant community impact, such as
transportation, or because it confers a particular and perhaps monopolistic privilege upon the applicant to the actual or likely exclusion of
others, or because it will have implications over a long period of time.
In these circumstances, a trial-type hearing is seen as providing an
assurance to the public that the award of the license was made fairly.
Criteria stated in such generality do not decide concrete cases.
To these criteria must be added an examination of judicial decisions
in areas of licensing similar to the specific authorization process.
Two areas are especially significant.
The first involves the determination by the Interstate Commerce
Commission of applications by common carriers for certificates of
public convenience and necessity. After the Supreme Court's decision
in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,4 7 it became necessary to ascertain
when the APA would apply to licensing proceedings solely because
due process required a trial-type hearing. In Riss & Co. v. United
States,"8 the Supreme Court reversed a lower court holding that the
APA hearing requirements did not apply to the ICC's determination
of a common carrier's application for a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to extend its operations over new routes. The Court's
per curiam decision consists of a single sentence: "The judgment is
reversed. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33." 249
In a case decided the next year, United States v. L. A. Tucker
Truck Lines, Inc.," ° the Court explained its decision in Riss & Co.
246 See text accompanying notes 77-99 supra.
247 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
248341
2

U.S. 907 (1951).

49 Id. at 907.
250 344 U.S. 33 (1952).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

70

[Vo1.119:1

by saying, "In Riss & Co. v. United States . . . this Court held that
officers hearing application for certificates of convenience and necessity
under § 207(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act are subject to the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act." 21 The decision in
Riss & Co. is obviously not without ambiguity. But because, as the
lower court had carefully demonstrated, the Interstate Commerce Act
itself did not require a hearing for the award of certificates of public
convenience and necessity of the kind that Riss & Co. had applied
for,2 52 it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the decision, particularly in its reference to Wong Yang Sung, was based on the belief
that due process required a hearing.
The second area involves the determination by the Comptroller
of the Currency of applications by national banks seeking authorization
to establish branches and by groups seeking new national bank charters.
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue of whether
due process requires a trial-type hearing in such determinations, the
law that has been developed is significant because of a number of important court of appeals decisions and because of the influential criticism
of Professor Davis.
When application is made for a charter for a new national bank
or branch bank, the Comptroller makes his decision to grant or deny
the application without holding a formal adversary hearing. As the
process was described in a recent case, "the Comptroller caused a
field investigation to be made of the applicant and the surrounding
circumstances. In accordance with the established practice, the agentexaminers of [the Comptroller] called upon the competitors of the
applicant bank, informed them of West Side's application and ascertained their reaction to the application." 25
Competitor banks are
typically permitted to file a written protest to the granting of the
application and may meet with a high official in the Comptroller's
office, often the Deputy Comptroller, but neither they nor the applicant
are granted a trial-type hearing.
In First National Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon," 4 a district court
held that the Comptroller was required to hold a hearing conforming
to the requirements of the APA before authorizing the establishment
of a branch bank. The court found that since the practice of not
holding such hearings "raise[s] a serious constitutional question" and
"[s]ince an Act should be so construed as to preserve its constitutionality, it becomes imperative, under the view here taken, to hold
251

Id. at 36 (citation & footnote omitted).

25249

U.S.C. §307(a) (1964).

Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1966).
254 232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964).

253

1970]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND OFDI

that the Administrative Procedure Act is applicable to the Comptroller
of the Currency" in determining applications for new banks and branch
banks.' 5
The court of appeals found that the district court was "mistaken"
and reversed, holding that "[p]rocedural due process is not offended
by the Comptroller's practice. The absence of a hearing provision in
the Banking Act raises no Constitutional question, for the omission
was within the power of Congress." "0 The court went on to hold
that a competitor bank was entitled to a de novo review in the district
court of the Comptroller's determination, but only because the absence
of an administrative record meant that the court could not perform
the reviewing function imposed upon it by the APA unless it could
adduce evidence and compile a record. Judge Sobeloff, dissenting,
agreed that there was no constitutional compulsion to conduct a trialtype hearing; he would have imposed additional fairness requirements
upon the Comptroller's informal procedures2 5 7
Since the decision in Smithfield, three other circuits have held
that the Comptroller is not constitutionally required to hold a trial-type
hearing in determining applications for national bank and branch bank
charters. 5 8 In commenting on this line of decisions, Professor Davis
has written, "What has happened during the 1960's is that the federal
courts have at last gone along with the idea that trial-type hearings
on contested applications for charters or branches are not required.
Three circuits have so held during 1966, 1967, and 1968, and the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari." 259
The law in these two areas-the determination by the ICC of
applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity and
the determination by the Comptroller of the Currency of applications
for national bank and branch bank charters-is plainly relevant to
OFDI's specific authorizations procedure. What conclusions, then,
should be drawn from it?
Notwithstanding the ambiguous brevity of Riss & Co., some observations may be ventured as to why the Court held that a due
process hearing was required. First, it was the practice of the ICC
when Riss & Co. arose to hold hearings before one of its own staff
examiners on all applications for certificates of public convenience and
2 55

Id. at 731.
F.2d 267, 269 (4th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 275. See also National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725,
736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
258 Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Citizens Bank v. Camp,
387 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Webster Groves
Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966). See also First Citizens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Camp, 409 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1969).
259 K. DAvis, DiscRETioNARY JUSTiCE, A PRELImINARY INQUIRY 122 (1969).
256 352
257
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necessity, even though there was no statutory requirement that it do
so. The case came to the Court upon the applicant's objection that
the presiding officer was not a hearing officer appointed pursuant to
section 11 of the APA. The Court's decision did not impose the
requirement of a hearing where none had previously been held. Rather
it required that the hearing be conducted by a section 11 hearing
examiner. The fact that the impact of the decision fell within such
a narrow margin, given the factual context in which the case arose,
may help to explain the brevity of the Court's disposition.
Second, a decision by the ICC to grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a common carrier has considerable public
significance because it affects the quality of a service required by wide
segments of the community. A decision to grant a certificate may
also have the result, depending upon the attendant economic circumstances, of foreclosing or limiting the possibility that a certificate will
subsequently be granted to prospective competitors.2 60 There is an
obvious legitimate public interest in the fitness of an applicant seeking
to perform an important community function and whose selection
may imply the grant of an exclusive privilege. The disposition in
Riss & Co. may reflect the Court's belief that a trial-type hearing is
the most effective procedure for assuring the public that decisions of
such substantial social significance are made openly and fairly. 6'
Third, applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity typically, although not invariably, are opposed by competitors of
the applicant or by other groups in the communities to be affected by
the proposed service. Thus, although no one intervened to oppose the
application in Riss & Co., twelve parties intervened in opposition to
the application in United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.,

62

the decision subsequent to Riss & Co. The presence of intervenors
usually means that determination of the application will require resolution of disputes involving adjudicative facts such as the quality of the
services being performed, the demand for additional or different services, the capacity of the applicant to perform particular services, and
the impact of granting the application upon other modes of transportation. The Court's decision in Riss & Co. may reflect the premise
underlying many earlier decisions that the fairest method for deciding
disputed issues of adjudicative fact is a trial-type hearing. 63
260 See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
261See Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951), rev'g per curiam 189 F.2d 369
(7th Cir. 1951) (APA applies to Post Office fraud order) ; Door v. Donaldson, 195
F2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (APA applies to Post Office order that films are obscene).
262344 U.S. 33 (1952).
263See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933) ; Goldsmith v. United
States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Londoner v. City of Denver,
210 U.S. 373 (1908).
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It may be argued that there is no difference in principle between
the determination by the ICC of an application for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity and the determination by OFDI of
an application for a specific authorization. Both determinations, the
argument would run, require an agency to decide whether to grant
an applicant permission to do something which would be illegal without
such permission. Although this argument may seem plausible in terms
of a generalized description, it overlooks significant practical differences between the two determinations.
First, the determination whether a particular direct investor will
be permitted to exceed the limits upon foreign direct investment imposed by the substantive regulations is of limited public significance.
Second, so long as there is some flexibility in adjusting the aggregate
amount permissible for specific authorizations in a given year, a decision to grant any particular application for a specific authorization
will rarely, if ever, have the effect of foreclosing the possibility that
a subsequent application of comparable merit will be granted. Moreover, a decision to deny an application for a specific authorization has
effect for a limited period only, prohibiting the direct investor from
undertaking the proposed enterprise for the remainder of the calendar
year but leaving him free to do it the following year. It may sometimes be true that the impact of denial will be more severe, at least
when the inability to accept a business opportunity now means that
the opportunity will be lost forever, but in some cases it will be
equally true that the direct investor can take up the opportunity by
paying higher interest rates abroad. Third, the determination of
applications for specific authorizations will not require the resolution
of disputes involving adjudicative facts because OFDI assumes that
the statements made in the application are true-converting it, as it
were, into a stipulation-and because there are no intervenors to
oppose the application or challenge its statements.
Thus, the licensing process of the ICC which the Court spoke
to in Riss & Co. and the licensing process by which OFDI grants
specific authorizations are significantly different. These differences
create substantial doubts whether the rationale underlying the decision
in Riss & Co. would be held applicable to the specific authorizations
process.
The conclusion that the federal courts have reached in the second
area of present concern-that the Comptroller of the Currency is not
required to conduct trial-type hearings on contested applications for
national bank and branch bank charters-may seem inconsistent with
the principles suggested as helpful in explaining the result in Riss &
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Co. A decision by the Comptroller to grant or deny an application
for a new bank or branch bank charter will almost always have considerable public significance because it affects the quality of an important service required by the community in an area of every day
life. Similarly, such a decision will typically have a substantial impact
upon the economic position of competitors, perhaps to the point of
excluding the grant of future applications. 2" And because competitors
have standing to contest the application, the Comptroller is usually
required to resolve disputed issues of adjudicative fact-for example,
the capacity of the community to absorb new banking services, and
the impact that the introduction of new banking services may have
upon existing banks.
The nature of the determination the Comptroller is required to
make, then, would seem within the spirit of the principles usually
held to require a trial-type hearing. The fact that the federal courts
have held otherwise thus requires explanation. The courts' decisions
mean that the principles discussed in connection with Riss & Co. are
not exclusive and that competing principles are at play and will sometimes prevail. Several observations are relevant.
First, regulation of banking is the federal government's oldest
system of economic regulation. The Comptroller's practice of determining applications for national bank and branch bank charters by
informal adjudication rather than by a trial-type hearing is part of
a tradition begun with the enactment of the National Banking Act
in 1864." 5 As the court of appeals said in Smithfield, "the uniform
administrative practice of the Comptroller for a hundred years has
sanctioned his present course. True, his own regulations had permitted an adversary hearing, but resort to these rules was entirely at
his option." 266 Similar informal practices have long existed throughout the area of governmental regulation of banking. Two leading
scholars have noted:
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System considers requests for various types of licenses, including membership in the Federal Reserve System, engaging in certain
banking activities by member banks, and acquisition of bank
stock by bank holding companies. .

.

. The Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation grants or denies petitions for admission to insurance. For the most part, each of these agencies
2 7
makes its determinations without hearings at any stage.

Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
26512 U.S.C. §§21-215b (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
266 352 F.2d at 270.
267 W. GFuLHoRN & C. BYSE, supra note 69, at 662.
264See
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In Fahey v. Mallonee2 0 the Supreme Court assigned considerable
significance to the tradition in banking regulation of determining controversies by methods other than trial-type hearings. The Federal
Home Loan Bank Administration, without notice or hearing, had
appointed a conservator to enter into possession of a bank. The Court
held that the power of summary appointment "is a heavy responsibility
to be exercised with disinterestedness and restraint, but in the light
of the history and customs of banking we cannot say it is unconstitutional." "9 The extensive historical and customary roots of the Comptroller's practice of determining applications for bank charters by
informal methods may have influenced the courts whose decisions have
sustained its constitutionality.
Second, a substantial body of informed opinion, particularly
within the banking community, holds that a trial-type hearing is an
inappropriate procedure for making decisions upon applications for
new bank and branch bank charters. The procedures by which the
Comptroller determines such applications is similar to those used by
bankers to make business decisions generally. As long ago as 1940,
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure wrote:
When a private banker receives a request for a loan from a
stranger, the bank will investigate his reputation, his financial
condition and the like, and will reject or accept his request
accordingly. This is a businessman's way of determining the
issue, and it is an expeditious method. Where the investigators are trained and trustworthy, a hearing is nothing but
a lawyer's excrescence."'
The fact that the Comptroller makes banking decisions by procedures
corresponding to those used by members of the banking community
to decide similar questions suggests that these may be the most appropriate means for making such determinations.
In addition, trial-type hearings are often an ineffective vehicle
for making certain kinds of administrative determinations. In commenting upon the Comptroller's approach, Professor Davis has written:
A trial is surely a clumsy means of determining how many
banks and which banks ought to serve a community, and
I think the Federal Communications Commission and the
Civil Aeronautics Board might well learn from the banking
agencies how they can better handle their comparative application cases. The Comptroller properly, in my opinion,
268332 U.S. 245 (1947).
26 9d. at 253-54.
2 70
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avoids proceedings in which each witness presents a mixture
of evidence and argument in favor of his view about economic
imponderables and each cross-examiner presents arguments
on the other side in the guise of questions. Written presentations of economic data, coupled with conferences, seem to me
preferable to trials, except on issues of specific fact.Y
In a related context, Judge Leventhal has observed:
The particular point most controverted by petitioners is
the effect of the CAB regulation on their business. The issue
involves what Professor Davis calls "legislative" rather than
"adjudicative" facts. It is the kind of issue involving expert
opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively resolved
by testimony. It is the kind of issue where a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings."'
The Supreme Court has approved on several recent occasions the
practice of certain federal administrative agencies of dispensing with
trial-type hearings in the determination of applications that do not meet
the minimal policy requirements set out in a generally formulated rule,
even when the agency's governing statute seemed to require a hearing
for the determination of such applications2 3 Although these decisions
are not directly on point, they suggest that courts are sensitive to the
possibility that trial-type hearings may not always be the most effective
means of making decisions involving certain issues of policy.
Avoidance of a trial-type hearing may be regarded as necessary
for another reason, noted in Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon:
[I]f bank applicants were subjected to severe
examination, public presentation of unfavorable
were forced to disclose their future plans and
competitors, public confidence in the banking
be adversely affected. 4

public crossevidence and
programs to
system could

Similar concerns led the Supreme Court to observe, in Fahey v.
Mallonee, that more formal procedures, constitutionally necessary in
271

Davis, Administrative Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31
713, 715 (1966) ; see H. WADE, supra note 87, at 119.
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272 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.) (footnotes
omitted), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
27
3 FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). See also Conley Electronics Corp. v. FCC, 394
F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1968); Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J.),
aff'd, 369 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967) ; Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy
Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw.U.L. REv. 781 (1965); Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HA..v.
L. REv. 921 (1965).
274370 F2d 381, 385 (8th Cir. 1966).
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some situations, may be dispensable in banking cases because of the
"delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving
credit during an investigation." 275 The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure expressed similar views:
The Committee recognizes, however, that a major safeguard is careful and conscientious investigation, that in determining whether individuals are suited to engage in the
banking business, or whether the community needs a bank,
or whether a bank should be insured and similar questions,
a congeries of imponderables is involved, calling for almost
intuitive special judgments so that hearings are not ordinarily
useful, and that the banking business is a delicate one so
that the advantages and importance of ready and frank information may outweigh the dangers of accepting confidential
information. Accordingly, and in the absence of any substantial evidence that there has been an abuse of power, the
Committee is not prepared to recommend that either hearings
be held prior to denial or that in all cases the identity of the
author of the adverse evidence be disclosed to the applicant." 6
The hypothesis that bankers understand the informal decisionmaking practices adopted by the Comptroller and regard them as
appropriate for deciding the questions posed may explain why the
constitutionality of these practices went unchallenged in the appellate
courts for one hundred years. 7 Parenthetically, part of the explanation may also lie in the hypothesis that bankers appreciate the
relatively greater speed and expedition by which informal methods can
produce a decision. The views of the regulated industry on the
inappropriateness of trial-type hearings may have influenced the judicial
decisions sustaining the Comptroller's practices.
Third, the results the Comptroller and other federal banking
agencies have achieved by use of informal methods of adjudication in
regulating the banking community have received unusual praise from
commentators and courts. Professor Davis has termed the regulation
of national banks "the outstanding example in the federal government
of regulation of an entire industry through methods of supervision,
and almost entirely without formal adjudication," 278 and suggested
that "other regulatory agencies have much to learn from the relatively
informal but highly successful methods of the banking agencies." 279
275 332 U.S. at 253. See also First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F2d
267, 2275
(4th Cir. 1965) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
7
6 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FiNAL REPORT,

277See
278
2

supra note 43, at 142-43.

Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1966).

1 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 4.04, at 247.

79Id. §7.01, at 157 (Supp. 1965).
K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUsTIcE, A

See also Davis, supra note 271, at 713, 715;
PRELimINARY

INQ R Y 118 (1969).
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Similar views have been expressed by the Supreme Court 20 and by
1
28
lower federal courts.

Moreover, the Comptroller has responded affirmatively in recent
years to professional criticism that some of his procedures are not as
fair as they might be made. For example, in 1968 the rule requiring
that all information about an application be kept secret was changed
to permit competitors and other interested parties to inspect "all written
material submitted by either the applicants or protestants .

.

. with

the exception of personal financial and biographical data submitted in
confidence to the Comptroller's Office." 282
The Comptroller's ability over a long period of time to supervise
and regulate the banking industry by means of informal adjudication,
and his willingness, in response to informed criticism, to modify his
practices in the direction of fuller disclosure of the materials underlying the decision, may have further influenced the judicial decisions
sustaining the validity of the practices.
Finally, the courts that have sustained the use of informal hearings by the Comptroller may have been concerned over the practical
burden that a requirement of a trial-type hearing would impose upon
the agency and the applicant. In 1968, the Comptroller received 1,166
applications for branch bank charters and 68 applications for national
bank charters; 283 in 1969, he received 1,391 applications for branch
bank charters and 104 applications for national bank charters."'
These applications obviously represent a large volume of business.
The judicial decisions holding that the Comptroller need not decide
these applications by means of a trial-type hearing may reflect a
recognition of the potential consequences-particularly the delay in the
determination of applications-that a hearing requirement might produce.
The circumstances under which the Comptroller's informal licensing procedures were sustained against constitutional challenge bear
significant similarities to those of OFDI's specific authorizations
process. The Comptroller of the Currency is a federal administrative
agency engaged in the regulation of certain economic activity, in part
by the determination of applications made by individual members of
280 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
281 Northwest Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 303 F.2d 832, 843 (8th Cir.
1962); Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 307
F.2d 580, 581-83 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963).
282 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 123 (1969)
(quoting from letter from Comptroller's Chief Counsel).
283

1968 U.S.

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY

AN. REP. 8, 12.

Letter from David C. Motter, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, Oct. 22,
1970, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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the regulated industry. Trial-type hearings seem inappropriate for
determining these applications for several reasons: the applications
typically include confidential information to which trial-type hearings
would grant exposure, often at the expense of public confidence in the
applicant or to the competitive disadvantage of the applicant; the
applications typically require the exercise of a policy judgment, often
on the basis of economic assessments and forecasts, not well-suited to
determination by the cumbersome methods of a trial-type hearing;
the applications often require prompt action-"ripeness is all"-if their
grant is to be useful and effective. In substantial measure these comments are equally pertinent to applications for specific authorizations.
The differences that remain between the circumstances under
which the Comptroller acts in determining applications and those under
which OFDI acts tend toward the conclusion that due process would
impose even fewer procedural requirements upon OFDI's licensing
processes. Determinations by the Comptroller typically will have a
considerable impact upon the public and upon the economic position
of competitors, perhaps to the point of excluding the grant of future
applications. Determinations by OFDI will rarely affect anyone except the applicant. Because there is some flexibility in the aggregate
amount for which specific authorizations will be granted annually,
determinations by OFDI are also far less likely to prejudice competitors. Moreover, the Banking Act indicates an intention to afford
protection to existing banks, particularly state banks, by its provision
that national banks may not be granted branch rights beyond those
which state law authorizes to state banks."85 None of the basic documents creating OFDI indicates an intention to protect competitors of
an applicant for a specific authorization. Determinations by the Comptroller typically will require in some degree the resolution of disputed
issues of adjudicative fact. So long as OFDI accepts the application's
statements as true for purposes of determining it, there will typically
be no necessity to resolve factual disputes or issues of credibility.
Finally, determinations by the Comptroller typically do not require consideration of a foreign affairs component. In determining
applications for specific authorizations, the Director of OFDI performs a function that implicates and is at least adjacent to foreign
affairs concerns. A central consideration in the determination of an
application is the effect that a decision to grant will have upon the
nation's balance of payments position. Courts have often been led
to conclude that questions bearing such a close relationship to foreign
36
2 5 12 U.S.C. §
(c) (1964); see First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122
(1969) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966) ; Davis,

The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 460-61 (1970).
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affairs concerns are hardly well-suited to determination by means of
a trial-type hearing. 6
In light of these facts, it seems fair to conclude that the decisions
holding that due process does not require the Comptroller to grant
a trial-type hearing in determining applications are authority for the
proposition that OFDI need not grant such a hearing.
C. Conclusion
This analysis suggests that although the determination of applications for specific authorizations is licensing and therefore adjudication within the meaning of section 2 of the APA, the hearing requirements of section 5 do not apply because there is neither a statutory
nor a constitutional requirement that such applications be determined
by a trial-type hearing.
VI.

THE REQUIREMENT THAT GROUNDS FOR DECISION

BE

STATED IN DETERMINING APPLICATIONS

The question is whether OFDI gives adequate statement of the
grounds for decision in granting and denying applications and requests
and in imposing conditions upon the grant, of such applications and
requests. The question arises in the context of proposals for informal
voluntary settlements and of applications for specific authorizations.
Two provisions of the APA require agencies to provide a statement of the grounds for decision in certain circumstances. Section
6(d) of the Act provides:
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or
in part of a written application, petition, or other request of
an interested person made in connection with any agency
proceedings. Except in affirming a prior denial or when the
denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by
a brief statement of the grounds for denial.2 "7
The other provision, section 8(b), states:
All decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative
decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a statement of-(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or
basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record ....
.88
286 Cf. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960) ; Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); L. JAFFE, sUpra note 123, at

364-65.

U.S.C. § 5 55(e)
Id. § 557(c) (3).

2875
28
8

(Supp. V, 1970).
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Almost four decades have passed since the Supreme Court suggested, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, that "due process of law
requires that it shall appear that the order is within the authority of
the officer, board or commission, and, if that authority depends upon
determinations of fact, those determinations must be shown." 289
There is little authority since that time suggesting that the requirement of administrative findings or reasons is of constitutional dimension; several significant cases are to the contrary.2 90 Two leading
commentators have stated that "[t]he approach of Chief Justice
Hughes in the Panama Refining case has had no germinal significance"
and "the 'doctrine' of that case may fairly be said to have died in
very early infancy." " Professor Davis believes that the "idea that
the Constitution requires administrative findings seems clearly untenable" 292 and has concluded, after a careful summary of the more
recent cases, that "the Supreme Court has seemingly moved away
from that view"2 3 in the period since Panama Refining was decided.
The answers to the questions presented in this section of the
article will rest, then, upon the proper application of sections 6(d)
and 8(b) of the APA, rather than upon the Constitution.
A. Proposals for Informal Voluntary Settlements
Section 5(b) of the APA requires that "[t]he agency shall give
all interested parties opportunity for-(1) the submission and consideration of . . . offers of settlement . . . when time, the nature
," " Because
of the proceeding, and the public interest permit ....

informal settlements are so widely used, "eliminating the time and
expense which are accompaniments of formal hearings," "' it is not
surprising that they should be described as "truly the lifeblood of the
administrative process." 298

The provisions of section 5(b) apply to "[c]ases of adjudication
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing." It was concluded earlier that compliance
proceedings came within that definition. The settlement procedures
U.S. 388, 432 (1935).
290 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); cf. Pacific States
289293

Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
& C. BysE, supra note 69, at 1139 n.6.
291 W. GELLHoRw
2922 K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 16.04, at 442.
293 Id. § 16.01, at 436.
2945
25
29

& N.

U.S.C. § 554(c) (Supp. V, 1970).

W. GEU.LHoa

& C. BYsE, sipra note 69, at 641.
supra note 43, at 35. See also L.

6 ATTORNEY GENERAi'S FINAL REPORT,
NATHANSON, mtpra note 225, at 26-28.

JAFFE
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described in OFDI's regulations are its response to the requirement
of section 5(b).
Two forms of settlement procedure-informal voluntary settlements and consent agreements-are set forth." 7 OFDI's general
policy is to dispose of compliance matters by informal voluntary settlements whenever possible. As the regulations make clear, the typical
practice for concluding an informal voluntary settlement will involve
an exchange of letters, the terms of which have been negotiated and
agreed upon in advance, between OFDI and the direct investor. The
direct investor's letter proposes the agreed-upon terms of the settlement; OFDI's letter accepts the proposal and closes the matter. Settlements by consent agreement, the second form of settlement procedure, have been rare. The question of when grounds for decision
must be stated is thus most important with respect to informal voluntary settlements.
It seems a fair conclusion that there is no legal requirement that
OFDI state grounds for decision in entering into-that is, in granting
proposals made by direct investors for-either informal voluntary
settlements or consent agreements.
Section 6(d) is inapplicable because its requirement of "a brief
statement" of the grounds for decision goes only to "the denial in
whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request."
Section 8(b) is inapplicable because its requirement that "[a]ll decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions . .
include a statement of-(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons
or basis therefore, on all material issues of fact, law, or discretion
presented on the record" is limited, as the language indicates, to
instances in which there has been a trial-type hearing. Section 8(b)
governs only "the procedure subsequent to a hearing and thus applies
to substantive decisions on the merits";29 it does not apply to preliminary orders entered prior to an adjudicatory hearing.29
This result is consistent with the language of section 8(b) and
with the policy of section 5(b) of encouraging agencies to make use
of settlement procedures when formal adjudicatory hearings can properly be avoided. A requirement that grounds for decision be stated
would probably inhibit settlement negotiations. The rationale underlying the requirement of section 8(b) that grounds for decision be
stated-to advise the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for
the agency's judgment-is unnecessary when the direct investor has
29715 C.F.R. pt. 1025 (1970).
298 City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F2d 326, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
299 Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
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consented to the closing of the matter. Informal voluntary settlements are not intended to be enforceable by court order and the
Supreme Court has held that consent agreements, which are intended
to be judicially enforceable, need not include findings of fact or grounds
for decision.3 00
Because the regulations contemplate that informal voluntary settlements will be concluded by an exchange of letters the terms of which
have been negotiated and agreed upon in advance, there will typically
be no occasion for OFDI to reject a proposal for an informal voluntary settlement. Conceivably, however, a direct investor might present
a proposal for an informal voluntary settlement without prior negotiation or agreement with OFDI as to the acceptability of its terms.
Under present practice, the Director's decision to reject a proposal
presented in this fashion is communicated to the direct investor by
a staff attorney. The question is whether OFDI must accompany the
rejection of an offer for an informal voluntary settlement with a statement of the grounds for decision.
It seems clear for at least two reasons that section 8(b) does not
apply. First, a decision to reject a proposal of settlement does not
follow a hearing on the merits. Second, a decision to reject a proposal of settlement is not subject to judicial review, either because it
is "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action," rather
than "final agency action," within the meaning of section 10(c) of
the APA,30 ' or because it is "agency action . . . committed to agency
discretion by law," within the meaning of section 10.302
It is less clear that section 6(d) does not apply. The language
of the section-in requiring that "the denial in whole or in part of a
written application, petition, or other request .

.

.

shall be accom-

panied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial"-would seem
applicable when read literally to proposals for informal voluntary settlements. The literal reading, however, is probably incorrect.
The success of the settlement procedures enjoined upon agencies
by section 5(b) depends crucially upon their freedom from formal
requirements and restrictions. If settlement procedures are to perform
the important function that the APA contemplates-if they are to
conclude in settlement agreements and thus obviate the need for litigation-they must be permitted to be informal, flexible, and hospitable
to the give-and-take of negotiation that results in the making of
0 NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318 (1961). See also NLRB v.
Standard Transformer Co., 202 F2d 846 (6th Cir. 1953) ; NLRB v. J.L. Hudson
Co., 135 F2d 380 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 740 (1943) ; National Candy Co.
v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 610 (1939).
3015 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. V, 1970).

02Id. § 701(a); see 4 K. DAv~s, Mlpra note 35, at §28.16.

84

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.119:1

proposals and counter-proposals. This explains why decisions made
during the course of settlement negotiations are not subject to judicial
review. It may also explain why the Attorney General's Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act stops well short of reading section
6(d) to require that reasons be given for the rejection of a proposed
settlement:
If proposals are submitted and they are unsatisfactory, the
agency should consider the advisability of informing the parties involved of the conditions, if any, on which the agency
is willing to settle the controversy or accept compliance without formal proceedings.3 3
An agency seriously engaged in settlement negotiations will doubtless
find it useful to explain why it cannot accept particular proposals for
settling a case. The incentive to continue the dialogue insures that
such explanations will be made for as long as the agency believes
settlement appropriate. But this is a far different matter from requiring an agency to supply a written statement of the grounds for
decision every time it rejects a proposal for settlement.
The consistent and sensible tradition by which informal settlement procedures have been exempted from judicial supervision and
formal restridtions suggests that section 6(d) does not apply to decisions by OFDI to reject a direct investor's proposal for settlement
and therefore that OFDI need not state grounds for decision in rejecting such proposals.
B. Applications for Specific Authorizations
Section 8(b) applies only to "case[s] of adjudication required
by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing." It was concluded earlier that the determination of
applications for specific authorizations is not such an adjudication.3 0 4
The consequence of this conclusion is that the requirements stated in
section 8(b) do not govern the specific authorizations process and
that OFDI is not required to state the grounds for decision when it
grants applications for specific authorizations.
However, the requirement stated in section 6(d)-that "denial
in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request
of an interested person made in connection with any agency proceeding . . . be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for

denial"-would seem applicable to the denial of applications for specific
authorizations. It would also seem applicable to specific authoriza303ATToRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note
30 4

See text accompanying notes 234-86 mtpra.

31, at 49.
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tions that grant the direct investor less extensive relief than he had
requested, including grants that impose limiting conditions: such
grants would be "the denial . . . in part of a written application." 305

Section 6(d) applies to the denial of applications for specific
authorizations although not to the rejection of proposals for informal
voluntary settlements because the denial of an application for a specific
authorization, unlike the rejection of a proposal for an informal
voluntary settlement, is "final agency action" subject to judicial review
within the meaning of section 10(c), precisely the most obvious circumstance in which at least "a brief statement of the grounds for
denial" is desirable.
In any event, the terms of section 6(d) are applicable to the
specific authorizations process because they are tracked by a provision
in OFDI's regulations:
Decisions. Written notice of action taken on an application [for a specific authorization] shall be given to the
applicant. Whenever an application is denied, such notice
shall include a brief statement of the grounds therefor30 6
It seems a fair assumption that section 6(d) and the provision just
quoted share a common intention and meaning.
Before undertaking to determine the implications of section 6(d)
for the denial of applications for specific authorizations, the meaning
of "a brief statement of the grounds for denial" must be ascertained.
Virtually the only decision explicitly comparing the terms of an administrative order to the requirements of section 6(d) is City of San
Antonio v. CAB. 30 7 The court there sustained a consolidation order
that denied certain applicants an opportunity to participate in a
scheduled hearing. After noting that section 8(b) was not applicable,
the court said:
The Board's consolidation order more than complied with
the requirements of Section [6(d)]. The order made clear
that the Board's purpose in consolidation was to avoid unduly
complex and protracted proceedings, citing the "high pri805 When OFDI provides a direct investor with a "brief statement of the grounds
for denial" of an application, it issues an "order" within the meaning of § 2(6) of
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (Supp. V, 1970), which must be made available for
public inspection and copying pursuant to § 3(a) (2) (A) of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (a) (2) (A) (Supp. V, 1970). Compare Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 774-75 (1967), with ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MEMORANDUM

ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION

SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PRO-

ACT 15 (1967). See also American Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696
(D.C. Cir. 1969); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusTIcE, A PRELIMINARY IXQumY
110-11 (1969); Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations,
56 GEo. L.J. 18, 22 (1967).
806 15 C.F.R. § 1000.801(b) (1970).
307374 F2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see Davis, Emerging Trends and Problems,
22 AD.L. REV. 223, 238 (1970).
CEDURE
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ority" assigned by the President to speedy conclusion of the
proceeding. This was sufficient. 0
The order which the court approved as complying with the mandate
of section 6(d) thus consisted of little more than a generalized reference to the desirability of avoiding procedural complexity and to the
necessity for bringing the proceeding to as speedy a conclusion as
practicable.
Because of the paucity of decisions interpreting section 6(d), it
will be helpful to consider briefly several important decisions involving
the meaning of section 8(b). Whatever the words "a brief statement
of the grounds for denial" may mean in section 6(d), it seems clear,
if only as a matter of plain meaning, that they state a less stringent,
less exacting requirement than the words of section 8(b), which provide that all decisions shall include "a statement of-(A) findings and
conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues
of fact, law, or discretion presented .

,, o

Perhaps the leading decision in this area is SEC v. Chenery
Corp 1 ° The Supreme Court there remanded a proceeding to an
administrative agency because the grounds upon which the agency
had placed its determination were invalid. The Court was aware that
the result reached by the agency might be supportable if placed on
other grounds, but it made clear that it was the agency which must
determine whether to adopt those grounds. The Court emphasized
that "the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that
the grounds upon which an administrative agency acted be clearly
disclosed and adequately sustained" and that "an administrative order
cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in
exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained." 311 By emphasizing the importance of findings and reasons
for the purpose of permitting informed judicial review that gives
proper deference to an agency's authority, the Court underscored an
earlier remark that it "must know what a decision means before the
duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong." 812
In a more recent decision, Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
' 3 the Court made clear that the rule of Chenery concerning the
States,31
308 374 F2d at 331.
309 See Transcontinental

Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F2d 466, 478 (5th Cir.

1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
310 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
3" Id. at 94, 95.
312 United States v. Chicago, M., St. P., & Pac. R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511
(1935). See also City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 694-95 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; Friendly, The "Limited Office" of the Chenery Decision,
21 AD. L. REv. 1 (1968).
313371 U.S. 156 (1962).
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necessary preconditions for judicial review was similar to the rationale
of section 8(b) of the APA:
There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the
choice made, no indication of the basis on which the Commission exercised its expert discretion. We are not prepared
to and the Administrative Procedure Act will not permit us
to accept such adjudicatory practice. See Siegel Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 327 U.S. 608, 613-614. Expert
discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but
"unless we make the requirements for administrative action
strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no practical
limits on its discretion." New York v. United States, 342
U.S. 882, 884 (dissenting opinion). "Congress did not purport to transfer its legislative power to the unbounded discretion of the regulatory body." Federal Communications
Comm'n v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90.
The Commission must exercise its discretion under § 207 (a)
within the bounds expressed by the standard of "public convenience and necessity." Compare id., at 91. And for the
courts to determine whether the agency has done so, it must
"disclose the basis of its order" and "give clear indication
that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has
empowered it." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313
U.S. 177, 197. The agency must make findings that support
its decision, and those findings must be supported by substantial evidence. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81, 93; United States v. CarolinaCarriers
Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 488-489; United States v. Chicago,
M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511.3 14
As two leading scholars have commented with respect to decisions
like Chenery and Burlington Truck Lines, "[t]he theory is that the
requirement of explicitly stated findings and conclusions will promote
responsible and carefully deliberated decisions." 315 An agency's statement of the grounds for decision under section 8(b) must permit a
court to understand the reasons underlying an agency's action and
their relationship to the agency's governing statute or rules, so that
it may properly exercise the function of judicial review. 16
3

14Id. at 167-68 (emphasis in original).
L. JAYFE & N. NATHANSON, stpra note 225, at 1049. See also NLRB v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1956) ; Secretary of Agriculture v. United
States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 35, at § 16.12; J. LANDIS, THE
315

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 75 (1938);
FELix FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 206,

Jaffe, Adventures in Administrative Law, in
219-20 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).

316
See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 306 F.2d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
H. FRIENDLY, THE FDERAL AD miNisTRATIVE AGECIES (1962); Elman, Notes on
Administrative Adjudication, 74 YALE L.J. 652, 655-56 (1965).
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The question of how fully elaborated an agency's reasons must
be in order to meet this requirement cannot be answered categorically.
As one court has soundly stated, "The requirement for findings necessarily varies according to the nature of the proceeding, and the context
and effect of the administrative action." 3' The extent of elaboration
required will depend upon the complexity of the issues decided. Professors Gellhorn and Byse have concluded:
While judicial expressions are far from harmonious in
this respect, most courts stress simply the need to understand
the administrative decision. That is to say, they require not
some stylistic organization of the agency's utterance, but,
rather, a communication
(in whatever form) of precisely
3 18
what has been decided.

In seeking to apply these conclusions to the denial in whole or
part of applications for specific authorizations, it must be recalled that
section 6(d) states a less stringent, less exacting requirement in its
call for "a brief statement of the grounds for denial" than section 8(b).
This margin of difference may be reflected in the tone of the description of section 6(d) given by the Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act: "The required statement of grounds
for denial, while simple in nature, must be sufficient to advise the
party of the general basis of the denial." 319
It is clear that section 6(d) does not require that an agency
reproduce the detailed reasoning that may be contained in its files or
internal memoranda. Nor does it require that an agency cast its
statement of the grounds for denial in any particular form, so long
as it serves the essential functions of describing the general basis for
the denial and permitting judicial review. This means that an agency
is not restricted to using a narrative, expository, or argumentative
form if it prefers to use another.3'
The practice of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in
denying applications submitted by aliens is instructive. Professor
Davis has described the practice:
The Immigration Service disposes of about 700,000 applications per year, of which some 35,000 are denied. Almost
all applications are handled without hearings. Some of the
questions involved are of great moment to the particular
aliens. When I discovered in 1964 that reasons were stated
in support of denials in only a few classes of cases and not
in about nine-tenths of them, I proposed to the commissioner
317 Capitol Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 292 F2d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
318 W. GELLEORN & C. BYSE, supra note 69, at 1154.

319 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
320
See id. 86-87.

MANUAL,

suPra note 31, at 70.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND OFDI

and other top officers of the Immigration Service that an
alien should always be entitled to have a written reason for
the denial of any application. The initial response to this
proposal was that it might require a doubling of the staff
of some seven thousand and that the proposal was totally
impractical. But on further study the service found the idea
feasible. For each of thirty-six types of applications it prepared printed cards, listing all the usual reasons for denials.
The officer was required to check the applicable reason and
to give the card to the alien. I think this was a great gain.
The alien now knows whether he should take some action to
change his circumstances and file another application, whether
the denial is based on a mistaken impression of the facts,
and whether he should fight the case further by going to a
superior officer. Furthermore, if the facts are in the file, a
superior officer has the means of checking the officer's judgment. The new system has caused no increase in the size
of the staff.321
A check-off system similar to that used by INS would probably
prove feasible for OFDI. The system would require OFDI to draw
up a list of the most common categories of grounds for denial and
to embody it in a standard letter of denial. OFDI would provide a
direct investor whose application for a specific authorization is denied
with "a brief statement of the grounds for denial" by checking off
the appropriate category on the list.
It is true that the system INS has fashioned was motivated by
the very substantial volume of applications denied annually. The
volume of applications for specific authorizations that OFDI denies
annually is hardly comparable. Applications that have little chance
of being granted are either discouraged by OFDI in the preliminary
stages or restructured upon advice from OFDI to fit into a pattern
that will result in a grant. As a result, the burden of stating briefly the
grounds for denial is not statistically great. It is true that section 6(d)
also requires OFDI to state the grounds for denial when it grants
an application for a specific authorization only in part, which will
include typically those instances in which conditions are imposed upon
a grant, but this burden is not onerous either.
The fact that OFDI denies far fewer applications annually than
INS does not undercut the justification for a check-off system, so
long as the category of the ground for denial that OFDI checks off
is responsive to the factual assertions upon which the direct investor's
application relies. When OFDI's decision rests upon extrinsic factors,
it must go beyond merely checking off a category of a ground for
321
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denial and must include a brief reference to the factual assumption
that motivated its decision to deny.
C. Conclusion
Section 6(d) of the APA requires that OFDI provide direct
investors with a "brief statement of the grounds for denial" when it
denies an application for a specific authorization. There is no requirement that OFDI provide such a statement when it grants an application for a specific authorization. Section 6(d) does not apply to
the process by which informal voluntary settlements are concluded.
VIII. POSTSCRIPT: THE ADAPTABILITY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT

One of the motivating impulses behind passage of the APA "was
to introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of
administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had
departed widely from each other." 322 Given such a purpose, it was
necessary that the APA state procedural standards with sufficient precision that agencies might effectively implement them and with sufficient generality that agencies might creatively adapt them to the wide
range of their respective regulatory responsibilities. The creation of
a new agency like OFDI presents an opportunity for considering the
wisdom of the balance Congress struck between precision and generality. The opportunity is particularly useful because of the important
differences in origin and function between OFDI and the older agencies
that provided the conception upon which the APA was modeled.
Application of the APA to OFDI requires examination of certain
questions basic to fair administrative procedure: the definition of the
term "agency" with its related consequences for the separation of
investigative, prosecuting, and adjudicatory functions; the designation
of a presiding officer at administrative hearings; the character of disciplinary and licensing proceedings; the relevance of foreign affairs
considerations; and the necessity that grounds for decision be stated
in certain circumstances. The process of reasoning toward answers
to these questions has been the substance of this article.
The discussion has proceeded primarily in terms of the fundamental principles of administrative fairness embodied in the APA. The
conclusions reached are realistic and workable, and ought not inhibit
OFDI's performance of its regulatory responsibilities. That questions
concerning the application of the APA can be resolved pragmatically
in terms of principle demonstrates its capacity to adapt to new challenges in administrative regulation.
322 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).

